Mission Impossible – the MCA’s Future Coastguard System

26. February 2013 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

 

 

I have blogged about the use of Technology & HM Coastguard in the past (see http://coastguardsos.com/techno-trouble/), but on reading the MCA’s brave new vision for the Future Coastguard System, I’ve touched on the topic again.

I say ‘Brave’ new vision, should I have said ‘Impossible’? Please read and make your own minds up.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/supporting_documentation_final.pdf

“Underpinning maritime domain awareness is the knowledge base of HM Coastguard. The knowledge

base is geographical information covering the entire service area enriched by an awareness of

environmental factors, social relationships, the availability, capabilities and limitations of SAR assets

and any other significant features that allow staff to fully understand the scene of action remotely.”

Under the ‘Old’ Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) System (before Forth & Clyde MRCC’s closed) there were 18 MRCC’s around the UK.

Given that HM Coastguard is responsible for in excess of 19,491miles of coastline (the MCA website is wrong), we can approximate that each MRCC had the responsibility for around a 1,000 miles of coastline.

The importance of Local Knowledge is such that each officer has to sit an exam & prove their competence.

By closing 50% of MRCC’s each coastguard will have immediately learn the complete Local Knowledge of an approx extra 1,000 miles of Coastline.

“Under our proposals, the MOC will be supported by a subsidiary site at Dover, where the site

infrastructure is such that it can assume the role of the MOC once reinforced with additional staff.

Other Coastguard Centres will be located at Aberdeen, Shetland, Stornoway, Belfast, Milford Haven,

Falmouth, Holyhead and Humber; with a much smaller operation on the tidal River Thames in

London.”

During the closure program and before the new Maritime Operation Centre is working, the remaining coastguards must manage without the new technology to assist and also, importantly without sitting any additional local knowledge exam.

“Operators will, supported by technology, spend the necessary time validating and developing this knowledge base, and remain competent in its application. Trainees will commence with a section proximate to their normal place of work but will, over time, become familiar with the entire service area.”

 

(The statement above assumes that Coastguards will move from closing stations, that there will be time to learn when workload has doubled / trebled and that there is a full complement of staff.)

So, eventually Coastguards will be expected to be ‘familiar’ of all 19,491+ miles of coastline and given that the Future Coastguard System talks about “UK Maritime Domain Awareness” this will include anywhere in the world that a UK flagged ship is at anytime i.e. Global Awareness.

Even if the new technology that this plan relies heavily on does work, the sheer magnitude of the scope of ‘local knowledge’ that Coastguards will have to be proficient in cries out for more staff not less!

The introduction of technology (computer systems, databases, automated monitoring and communications) is not something that I am against, far from it, I fully embrace technology where I can but I would not bet my life on it without proven back-up alternatives.

HM Coastguard MRCC’s are being closed before the new MOC is running and any real world proof that replacement systems work – FACT.

The hasty rate of closures are failing to capture existing local knowledge, there is documentary proof that the so called ‘Pairing’ system between MRCC’s only worked between 2 of the original 18 rescue centres.

These facts are important because they underpin the basis of the new Future Coastguard System (FCS).

Please bear with me on the next bit… I’m not going off topic but trying to make a very important point about technology & safety requirements!

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974

http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-of-life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx

These regulations are intended to provide proper safeguards for all vessels using our seas.

SOLAS V/19 – Carriage requirements for ship borne navigational systems and equipment

V/19.2.1 All ships irrespective of size shall have:

V/19.2.1.4 nautical charts and nautical publications to plan and display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot and monitor positions throughout the voyage; an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) may be accepted as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph;

V/19.2.1.5 back-up arrangements to meet the functional requirements of subparagraph .4, if this function is partly or fully fulfilled by electronic means.

 

http://www.imo.org/ourwork/facilitation/documents/solas%20v%20on%20safety%20of%20navigation.pdf

In other words; yes, you can use technology of computerised navigation systems but you need to have a tried and trusted back-up system of in-date’ physical charts and manual navigation equipment.

There are many other maritime laws which demand the use of human involvement as a back-up to technology!

 

So why are the Government, DfT and MCA ignoring the wisdom and proven requirements of human (Coastguards) back-ups of sufficient MRCC’s around our coast? Especially as the replacing system is not proven!

 

The truth is; concerns are being ignored by those intent on seeing the service decimated, just to meet an unreasonable cost saving target that completely ignores operational sense.

Some of the MRCC’s closed/closing have excellent facilities which combine the knowledge and expertise of everyone in the responsible area, including the experts in HMCG that perform other functions such as Marine Surveying, safety assessments. The fact that most of these stations have staff living in a local proximity means excellent local on-scene response. The greater the area of responsibility will increase response times with a negative impact on incident containment.

Each MRCC is already in a location of need and incident numbers confirm this.  Similarly, the more stations you have, the greater chance you will have of stations picking up any weak Mayday calls or automatic transmissions.

Again, there have been instances where EPIRB equipment is fitted but auto distress and positioning has failed.
 ”No alarm was raised, even though the vessel was fitted with an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) and a MOB Guardian.”
See MAIB report http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2013/betty_g.cfm

Rescue coordination staff already have enough workload to contend with; there are multiple systems to monitor simultaneously, e.g. monitoring radio traffic from several masts which are all fed into one computer & speaker. Simultaneous broadcasts can be an issue; as stronger ones will drown out weaker ones.

Perhaps the MCA should be concentrating on improving existing systems with better prevention of communications breakdowns which have been highlighted in the press recently.

http://www.cable.co.uk/news/bt-outage-causes-communications-blackout-for-shetland-coastguards-801390143/

In the recent Transport Select Committee inquiry, much evidence was given about repeated communications problems but the MCA appear not to be addressing the issue, which will have greater impact as MRCC’s take on bigger areas to manage.

Failure to address current problems with existing technology that the FCG system will be built on is reckless, the MCA is making unproven claims of system ‘robustness’ and resilience.

Staffing is a crucial factor for the FCS, but it’s not surprising that the latest staffing figures for MRCC’s are still showing a significant shortage of staff especially at the ‘safe’ stations. (Even with the 2 closed stations taken out of the equation).  The Transport Select Committee review was highly critical of the way moral has been affected and staffing levels.

Are Coastguards leaving because they are fearful of workload/responsibility with a deep mistrust of the current plan?

Manning levels at the majority of MRCC’s are at crisis level, it is unlikely many will remain in the stations earmarked for closure; the bold assertions in the FCS concept of operation will flounder with the lack of experienced coastguards with local knowledge for many areas. This will have a dire impact on the FCS working.

In summary; the current plan is looking more unworkable each day, valuable knowledge and experience is being drained away at an alarming rate, reliability and communication issues are not being addressed.

The Future Coastguard System is a Mission Impossible!

There is no technology out there that can perform miracles.

HM Coastguard has 191years of hard learnt lessons in achieving today’s level of competence. The FCS looks likely to throw away much of this competence on an unproven operational theory.

NB. Just prior to me writing this blog, 5 Coastguard Officers from Liverpool MRCC were awarded the Chief Coastguards commendation for Exceptional and Meritorious service, this was for their part in rescue coordination of 23people from the MV Riverdance ferryboat exactly 5 years earlier. The rescue was in a Force10 gale in 7M seas and described as one of the most challenging rescues in modern maritime history.

http://m.blackpoolgazette.co.uk/news/traffic-travel/travel-news/riverdance-rescue-heroes-recognised-1-5428834

Why mention this? Well two reasons:

1). The existing MRCC’s work, in a proven statistical and operational way.

2). The MCA has failed to make any public acknowledgement of the stations achievements because it proves how vital this station is! When asked to comment in the newspaper article (link above), the MCA gave this reply:

A Maritime and Coastguard Agency spokesman today vowed there would be no change in how emergency situations were dealt with.

She said: “As part of the new structure, the Maritime Operations Centre will maintain an overview of activity right across the country and make sure work on search and rescue coordination, tackling pollution incidents and monitoring shipping is effectively managed.”

 

No mention of the award, no acknowledgement of staff, just a reference to the MOC with propaganda claims that contain no proof operational certainty.

 

Awards are scarcely given and this is not a unique occurrence, between the 5 Coastguards they hold 13 of these awards. It is something of a record and brings home the issue of MRCC being located in areas that have high incidents due to traffic volumes & notoriously treacherous areas of coastal responsibility (unlike the MOC – which is not on the coast!).

By CoastalJoe

 

 

Comments on the HOC Transport Committee meeting re the Coastguard on 22.10.2012

07. December 2012 · 2 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

I have delayed writing this because I am at a loss to comprehend how the government is completely deaf to the real concerns and evidence given against the proposed cuts in our Coastguard Service. Most of the post will refer to the  meeting of 22.10.2012, but I also want to get up to date with other events.  The views in this post are those of the author.

HOC TRANSPORT COMMITTEE Monday 22 October 2012

Wilson Room
Meeting started on Monday 22 October at 4.11pm. Ended at 5.59pm

The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the Maritime Incident Response Group: follow up
Witnesses

  1. Steve Quinn, President, Coastguard Section, Brian George, Liverpool Branch Representative, and Alex Dodge, Shetland Branch Chair, PCS, and Allan Graveson, Senior National Secretary, Nautilus
  2. Stephen Hammond MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport, Vice Admiral Sir Alan Massey KCB CBE, Chief Executive, Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
Members of the Transport Select Committee are: Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair); Steve Baker (Conservative, Wycombe); Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton); Julie Hilling (Labour, Bolton West); Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative, Spelthorne); Mr John Leech (Liberal Democrat, Manchester Withington); Karen Lumley (Conservative, Redditch); Karl McCartney (Conservative, Lincoln); Lucy Powell (Manchester Central); Iain Stewart (Conservative, Milton Keynes South); Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton).

As you can see from the times above, the meeting lasted for just over one and three quarters hours.

In a concurrent investigation, Ireland has undergone a thorough probe and report into its Coastguard service and the proposal of a new centralised base in Dublin.  Last week it was announced by Leo Varadkar, the Minister for Transport, that Coastguard centres at Malin Head, Valentia and Dublin will remain open.

“Through the utilisation of the most modern communications and IT infrastructure across a single national Coast Guard network, I will be proposing that the three centres will be more closely aligned and integrated,” he said.

“Therefore the current structure of three Coast Guard centres in Dublin, Malin and Valentia will continue to provide their current service but will be required to deliver new efficiencies in how these services are provided.”

Supporters for retention of the three stations claimed local knowledge during search and rescue missions would be lost if staff were forced to operate out of a centralised base in Dublin.

Joe McHugh, Fine Gael TD for Donegal North East, said the decision was a victory for common sense.

Here, the Commons Select Committee for Transport is due to publish the findings of its second inquiry next Tuesday; we wait in hope.  But whatever the recommendations are, it doesn’t mean things will change.  The government gave absolute assurances that no coastguard station would be closed until the new operation centre was up and running.  We have already seen these promises broken with the premature closures of Forth and Clyde.  Strangely, both these Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs) were also closed before the appointed dates that were given ahead of the new system being in place.

The British Isles, the clue is in the name, has a long and very proud maritime heritage.  We are surrounded by water and consequently the vast majority of our trade is via the sea.  Oh my goodness, as I’m writing this, there is a report coming in of a collision between two ships, near to Holland.  The English Channel is one of the busiest shipping lanes there is, we need the full complement of our MRCCs in order to be able to comprehensively cover in the event of accidents and emergencies.

We have a very rugged coastline in places, where it is hellishly dangerous when the sea is rough. Literally, thousands of lives have been saved by our Coastguard and now is not the time to shirk our duty of care.

To get back to the meeting on 22nd October; Louise Ellman, MP, chaired the meeting. I’ve had the pleasure of meeting with her at Portcullis House, she is a lady of knowledge and integrity.

I think it is evident within the first fifteen minutes that the views of Allan Graveson are not the same as those of his fellow witnesses.  I doubt very much they are the views of his members either.  I’ve met and spoken with a good number of people working in different MRCCs and I have not met one who agrees with the modernisation proposals (as they are) or who would be happy with just 11 coastguard stations!  Such a ridiculous statement to make.

When the discussion got round to the retention of staff and, consequently, local knowledge; it would appear the the coastguard service is going to lose the majority of its workers.  A large number of Coastguards are looking elsewhere for work and, in Liverpool alone, four very experienced coastguards have been lost in the last four months.

Another startling fact is that 15% of coastguard positions are currently vacant.  When Forth was closed there was a complement of 12 staff; just 2 transferred to Aberdeen, and ten left the service.  When the early closure of Forth happened, it was open one day and closed the next.  All four urged the government to stop and reconsider the very serious concerns. Louise Ellman then thanked them for their time and after an hour, they left and in came Stephen Hammond, the new Shipping Minister, and Sir Alan Massey, head of the MCA.

Stephen Hammond started by reading out a statement. He said that the command centre would be operational by April 2014.   Louise Ellman then stated that the statement he had just read out, contrasted starkly with what had just been heard from the four people from the PCS and Nautilus. Mr Hammond said there had been disagreements with some people actually involved and went to state that his predecessor, Mike Penning had meet with them in July 2010 and July 2012, so there had been extensive communication with them throughout the whole period. One meeting in 2010 and then waiting two years before having a second one, could never pass for extensive.  It beggars belief that he believes what he says to be plausible.  He then tried to  pass the answering over to Sir Alan Massey, but was thwarted by another question concerning the assurances that no closures would happen before a robust system was in place. Stephen Hammond said this had happened and that they were going ahead with the timetable as before.  Now, we know that to be untrue as Forth closed early, and Clyde effectively closed last month.  And no, he hasn’t visited any MRCCs or spoken with any Coastguards. And no, he didn’t know what the MOC (Maritime Operations Centre) was nor how it was meant to improve upon the current system.  He is completely certain that everything in the process is fine as he has discussed with civil servants and Sir Alan Massey.  NB Not one person who would be within the operational teams has been asked anything by him.  

Sir Alan Massey was asked how the MOC would help when up and running.  He said, If you had a large incident off the south west coast which was too big for Falmouth to deal with, you’d be able to bring in help from Shetland or Humber.  WHAT????? Methinks that would take more than the extra ten minutes he has already stated may be added on to the response times.  If you google ‘how long does it take to drown?’ you will see it’s about four minutes.  You can drown twice over within the ten minutes extra response time and as for waiting for them to get down from Shetland …… I’m not even going to go there!  When it was pointed out that the other views (from actual people in the service) they had heard differed from what these two were now saying, the response was, well they’re wrong.  By this time Mr Hammond seemed to be losing some of his patience and getting rather belligerent about the fact that the statement he made was being questioned.  He also stated that he believed the staff to be happy when asked about the contrary evidence – not sure the Coastguards would share his beliefs there, in fact, not one of the people I have spoken to, do!

As to local knowledge, by the end of this process, 159 staff with local knowledge will have left.  And no, there is not a 15% vacancy rate, there is only 13.8% and this hardly affects anything – hmmmmmm!

And so it went on.  The steering group was very knowledgeable, asking vital questions that demonstrated their concern for maritime safety.  Too often, Sir Alan Massey’s answers seemed to be “trust me I’m an expert” while Stephen Hammond replied that he had asked Massey and been told it was okay, so that was that.  In fact, Hammond demonstrated clearly, his complete ignorance of operational matters and, after claiming he had spoken to staff and gained their assurance that they were happy with the proposals, had to admit that he had not visited a single MRCC and the staff he had spoken to were in fact civil servants within the Department of Transport and Sir Alan Massey.  Oh dear!

Written by Lynne Gray

Mike Penning “.. a regional structure will put lives at risk ..”

01. August 2012 · Write a comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

It is always gratifying when you read quotes from people who agree with the same principles you are fighting for.  So I ask you to read the following article, quoting Mike Penning and appearing on his web site.

Mike Penning

Labour cuts threaten fire safety across Hertfordshire

19th August 2005

Mike Penning, MP for Hemel Hempstead and a former fire fighter, today expressed his concern at the announcement by John Prescott’s Whitehall department that it is to shut down the local fire control room, replacing it with a distant regional call centre based in Cambridge.

These cuts to local fire services have occurred without any input from local people, and mean that 999 calls will be answered up to 100 miles away – by operators who have little knowledge of Hemel Hempstead and the surrounding villages. The restructuring process will cost a massive £72 million, re-diverting resources away from frontline protection.

Mike Penning asserted,

“Despite the rejection of regional government in November’s North East regional referendum, John Prescott is moving ahead with his expensive plans to create new regional fire quangos. This will mean the local fire control room will be shut down.

“As a former fire fighter I know from personal experience how a regional structure will put lives at risk, since 999 operators will have less knowledge of the Hemel Hempstead area The East of England region contains 5.4 million people, and covers a mammoth area of 19,000 sq km. Civil resilience could also be damaged by placing all our eggs in one basket. If the regional centre is forced offline by a disaster or attack, the whole emergency response will go down across a massive geographical area.

“I oppose this damaging regional agenda. I believe that fire and rescue authorities must remain close and accountable to local people. I fear that local fire stations could be next if distant regional politicians continue with their cuts. John Prescott’s regional empire building is playing politics with fire safety.”

A well presented argument for not using a regional structure for the fire service, with emphasis being put on the loss of local knowledge.  The building Mike Penning is talking about is a regional centre, not a national centre, such as Penning’s Folly, the newly proposed HQ for the Maritime Coastal Agency.

It was a strong, and successful, argument  for not having a regional call centre for the fire service.  And that was with the added bonus of people being able to use postcodes, street names and landmarks to identify where a fire was.

Now imagine the argument against having a national call centre for the Maritime Coastal Agency.  If this is Mr Penning’s view of a regional centre, why oh why, is he trying to push through a national centre for the Coastguard Service? All the above points made by Mike Penning, Shipping Minister, are absolutely spot on for keeping every single coastguard station and not playing politics with people’s safety at sea.  Even more so when you imagine the tides and currents taking people and boats a long way from the original incident site.  Oh yes, and there aren’t many street names to go by, nor postal codes nor buildings!  Cliffs and rocks, yes, everything else would be down to critical local knowledge.

So what has changed? Nothing,  just the names and the party in power!  But the wonderful thing about all this is that Mike Penning has given us the perfect argument against the cuts to the Coastguard Stations and this empire building.

Graham Warlow, ex Watch Manager,  has re-jigged the last two paragraphs to show how Mike Penning’ arguments are absolutely perfect for

Justine Greening

the Coastguard SOS team trying to save the Stations from closure.

As an ex Coastguard, I know from personal experience how a national structure will put lives at risk, since the operators will have less knowledge of the any area other than where they live. The fact that Mike Penning opposed a regional structure for the fire service because of an area the size of the East of England, covering a mammoth 19,000 square kilometres, makes the notion of a national centre, covering an area of 243,610 square kilometres (nearly thirteen times the size), as bordering on insanity! If the national centre is forced offline by a disaster or attack, the whole emergency response will go down across the whole of the United Kingdom.
I oppose this damaging national agenda. I believe the Coastguard and rescue authorities must remain close and accountable to local people. I fear that more local Coastguard stations could go if distant national politicians continue with their cuts. Justine Greening’s national empire building is playing politics with people’s lives.
Written by Lynne Gray

‘The Shambles’ aka MCA head office

16. July 2012 · 2 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

The Coastguard SOS team is made up of members of the public who have serious concerns for the safety of people when the Coastguard stations closures are implemented, as unfortunately members of the actual Coastguard service are subject to gagging orders and cannot speak – who said this country was democratic?!

We’ve been telling you the good news that Mr Cameron stated in his letter;   “Finally, those centres that are planned for closure will remain open until 2015 in order to ensure that the planned transition to the new arrangements will maximise the retention of local knowledge.”

A very straightforward statement and one that was welcomed by the Coastguard SOS team fighting to keep all the stations open.  Thank goodness the Prime Minister has the sense to make sure the stations will stay open until 2015 at the very least, so that the changeover to a national call centre (see Penning’s Folly), would be smoother and give appropriate time for everything that would be necessary for the hand-overs.

Today, the news from Inverclyde Now gave the news about this, stating -

THE Clyde Coastguard rescue co-ordination centre at Greenock will close later this year as planned, it has been confirmed, despite a letter from the Prime Minister which appeared to say that Coastguard centres ear-marked for closure would stay open for another two years.

Coastguard campaigners received a copy of a letter from Prime Minister David Cameron to a constutuent which stated: “Those centres that are planned for closure will remain open until 2015 in order to ensure that the planned transitions to the new arrangements will maximise the retention of local knowledge.”

Campaigners issued statements saying the centres — including Clyde — had been granted a “reprieve.”

I would like to take issue with the words highlighted in red – the letter did not appear to state; the letter categorically stated that Coastguard centres earmarked for closure would stay open: and also for another two years; the years from 2012 to 2015 are three, unless my fundamental knowledge of mathematics is incorrect!

The page goes on to state -

But the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) insisted there has been no change to the plan and that Clyde Coastguard will shut in December with its work being transferred to the centres in Belfast and Stornoway.

Navy Buildings, Greenock

An MCA spokesman said: “The reform of Coastguard stations will go ahead as planned. The PM has written to his constituent to clarify the matter. (i) Under the plans the Coastguard co-ordination centres at Forth, Clyde, Great Yarmouth, Liverpool, Thames, Swansea, Brixham and Portland will close progressively by 31 March 2015.

“The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plan to close their base at Clyde [Navy Buildings in Eldon Street] and part of that plan means that the Clyde Coastguard and all its associated equipment must be removed. Staff are already informally aware of the intended closure date of 31 December 2012. (ii) 

“A change team comprising operational staff from Clyde, Belfast and Stornoway is actively managing the technical and operational work required to achieve the decommissioning of Clyde by 31 December 2012. We aim to transfer operational coordination for Clyde’s area to Belfast and Stornoway by 18 December 2012. This will avoid trying to manage technical switchover during the Christmas period.”

(i) The Prime Minister has written to this constituent to clarify the matter – indeed he has, and as said before, he categorically stated the coastguard stations would stay open until 2015.  There has been no other letter received.

(ii) Staff are already informally aware of the intended closure date of 31 December 2012.  And Happy New Year to you too! But seriously, what utter disregard and disrespect for the people in the team working there.

What an awful state of affairs this is.  The Prime Minister makes a statement in black and white and the MCA media team states this is incorrect! A very good question would be,  Who is running this country?

From the first announcement, this MCA plan has been riddled with inconsistencies and errors.  There has been no transparency, no listening to peoples’ concerns and, certainly, no risk and assessment exercises carried out on each particular station.  And, even more importantly, this is despite requests from the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament.  Horrendous ~ you cannot describe rocks and waves to a national call centre, which obviously does not have the local knowledge that is critical to successful rescues.

This is a cost cutting exercise that only benefits the Department of Transport and the elite of the MCA. Shame on them.

Written by Lynne Gray

Penning’s Folly

05. July 2012 · 4 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

So Penning’s Folly opens today.

This is the national Maritime Operations Centre.  It started life being commissioned as the National Fire Service Control Centre.  The idea was that anyone dialling 999 and asking for ‘Fire’ got routed to this centre.  Details of the location and nature of the fire would be recorded in Fareham and fire engines would be mustered from the local station.  After some consideration, the fire service said it was not feasible to run the fire service safely from a national centre.  So it was allocated to the Coastguard instead.

Now forgive me, but buildings have names and numbers.  They are on roads that also have names or numbers, as are landmarks like woods, forests and heathland, which can catch fire.  And fires may spread, but the addresses they start at do not move.  Compare that to an emergency on our coast. A holidaymaker on a hired boat sends up a flare and someone dials 999 asking for ‘Coastguard’, being put through to Penning’s Folly in deepest Hampshire.  If the caller is not a visitor, they may know where they are and possibly where the flare came from.  Or maybe not.  And even if the operator in Fareham knows the difference between two similar sounding coastal villages in any part of theUK, could they identify the ‘big rock’ that’s described to them as near where the flare came from?  And bear in mind, the casualty will be constantly moving with tides and currents, while someone inFarehamtries to work out which local team is nearest and – wait for it – co-ordinate the searching at Penning’s Folly!

They say the changes are making the Coastguard service more ‘modern’ and ‘robust’.  True they are developing a new IT system to ensure all the local centres that are left can have access to all incident data.  Assuming the new system works and is delivered on time, this would be a benefit whether you have the 9 centres they propose to keep or the 18 centres they have at the moment.  It doesn’t in itself enable 9 centres to operate as effectively as 18.  It’s NOT as robust to share work between 9 centres compared with 18 – the maths just don’t make that work.  In fact it is exactly half as robust, of course.

The Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament have both said they are unhappy that there has been no risk assessment of the closure of specific centres, and have even offered to contribute to the cost of undertaking the.  After all there is still time, with Swansea not due to close until 2015, for example.  Arrogance wins over common sense, with Penning declaring they’ve done a ‘general’ risk assessment and that’s good enough for him.  Easy to say for a minister whose constituency is landlocked.  But it will be conservative voters as well as others, from Penning’s Hemel Hempstead constituency as well as the rest of the UK, whose lives are being put at real risk by these senseless closures.

Written by Tim Douglas.

Today’s the day for a Ministerial jolly 
at the grand inauguration of Mike Penning’s Folly.
A quiet affair for fear of reality
that Penning’s plans will cause fatality
 
He ignored the calls for the plan to be scrapped
in order for his moment when hands will be clapped.
But when lives are lost because he didn’t listen
he must then face the tears as they glisten.
 
No joy today for a service long and proud
as truth of closure plans are lost in a cloud..
Whatever the cost of human life
Penning’s Folly will lead to strife.
 
Not even now is it too late to be brave
scarp the plans so that lives may be saved.
Be a man Penning, so you can sleep at night
because there will be no surrender without a fight!
 
Written by a fledgling poet! 

Concerns, contradictions & deceits re the closures of Coastguard Stations

29. June 2012 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

This following letter is to be given (by hand) to Mike Penning, the Minister responsible for the closure plans of Coastguard Stations. It highlights grave discrepancies between what is being said and the reality of matters. We sincerely hope that other MPs share the same qualities of integrity and honour that Paul Maynard does.

For the Attention of Paul Maynard MP

Ref. HM Coastguard  MRCC Closures (incl. Liverpool/Crosby)

25th June 2012

Dear Mr.  Maynard,

We have corresponded on this subject a number of times; I thank you for your prompt and diligent replies.

I am grateful therefore, for the opportunity that you have offered by taking my concerns directly to the Transport Minister Mike Penning, with your promise to ensure the matter gets full and fair consideration.

The attached document gives an outline of my concerns, the annex gives detailed information of those concerns stating the flaws in the plan and referenced documents.

I sincerely hope that once you have read this document you will fully back the call for closures to be halted.

You will be aware that these concerns are shared by many other people as the website www.coastguardsos.com proves. The campaign based on the website is led and run by members of the public, which I fully support.

I look forward to this opportunity and trust that it provides some way forward in resolving the major flaws in the MCA modernisation plan for HM Coastguard.

Yours faithfully,

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

 

The list below is a Summary of my concerns (they are not in any order), the appendix gives greater detail for each and references any corresponding evidence.

Concerns:

  1. Loss of local knowledge. There is no evidence that the ‘National Gazetteer‘ will be in place prior to any MRCC being closed. Majority of knowledge is held by the staff that are going to be lost before this system is in place or proven to be adequate in ‘real world’ incidents.
  2. Loss of Expertise & Experience. Many of the MRCCs that are to be closed have the highest incident rates and the majority of experienced staff will be lost.
  3. Early closure of MRCCs before MOC running or proven. There can be no cost justification for the early closure of MRCC when it is contrary to the explicit assurances made and risks compromising the whole modernisation strategy and more importantly the lives of people in the areas affected.
  4. Language & dialect issues. Much was made in the consultation process about retaining stations for the ability to speak e.g. Welsh. This has never had any operational basis.
  5. Pairing Fiction.  ‘Pairing’ between MRCCs is, in reality, (if it happens) it’s limited to switch over of 999 calls and monitoring of local VHF channels. Local Knowledge is NOT shared. Assurances were given on the basis that one of each pair could fully take over the others area, which is simply NOT TRUE.
  6. Unreasonable workloads. Remaining MRCCs will face unreasonable amounts of extra responsibility by taking on workloads which can equate to 4 or 5 times existing loads.
  7. Staff morale at all time low. Due to closures & item 6 there is an increase in all MRCCs being understaffed due to stress, sickness and staff leaving.
  8. Real flaws in MCA/HMCG plan not being addressed. Infrastructure has no proper resilience and as such will stop MOC from working.
  9. Incident handovers between MRCCs proven high risk, yet MOC system relies on process.
  10. Lack of Individual Risk Assessments as required by Law. There is no credible evidence that MCA has considered all the Risks associated with each closure. A blanket National Assessment is inadequate.

Summary

A U-Turn on closures of HM Coastguard MRCCs is urgently demanded.

There is significant evidence that gives compelling reasons for the current plan to be reconsidered.

The foundations of the modernisation plan were Pairing & Resilience; they no longer provide any credible basis for the plan.

Appendix

1.    Loss of local knowledge.

1a     Risk Overview table Ref. 6 Risk Mitigation states “No national standard Gazetteer” exists for Local Knowledge (document dated February 2011). http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2.risk_overview_table.pdf

1b    MCA response to Independent Review of 2nd Consultation “Local knowledge will be continuously gathered, stored and shared across MCA systems. This information will include alternative and multiple place names, including phonetic spelling and will be available, in a standard format, to all watch-keepers across the whole UK network.” http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/irt_response_table_v3.3.pdf

1c     See also Pairing in respect to “Retaining additional centres with one from each of the existing pairs and increasing to 24 hour coverage at all remaining stations will enable the current levels of local knowledge, local intelligence and familiarity with local languages, dialect and place names, to be transitioned into the new structure.”( From pdf referenced in 1b)

MCA documents (above) acknowledge the lack of a National Database for Local knowledge and promises to deliver such a system. Given the timeframe it will be impossible to implement a purpose written programme, any commercial system would need a fully quality controlled & verified customisation by trained experienced staff.

With imminent closure of MRCCs, much of this Local Knowledge will be lost before it can be added to the ‘National Gazetteer’, provided staff would be willing to add date prior to redundancy.

Ref.7 Local Knowledge – the Operational Context states

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/7.local_knowledge_the_operational_context.pdf

“Coastguard officers can still draw on detailed local knowledge by contacting a wide selection of coastal community based resources (CRS, RNLI, NCI, Harbour and port authorities etc.) for advice. “

However in an emergency situation this is hardly practical due to availability of such volunteer sources and will waste valuable time in any incident.

Justification for not keeping all MRCCs open was added cost of computer links/equipment to MOC; this prevents future updating of National Gazetteer and its interface with Master mapping data. Without access to the system, how can contributors ensure that the data is correctly entered? Without a Regional MRCC to audit any database (place names or maps/charts) how will it be properly audited? Any system depends on the quality of data to be effective.

HMCG has recognised the need for MRCCs at strategic places to provide an on-scene local service because of local risks, like the introduction of theLondonstation after the Marchioness disaster. Where is the proof that technology or working practices mitigate past requirements?

There are significant local variations to the National computer simulation software & planning, there are reports that prediction models do not fully cater for manmade influences on tide movement patterns.

2.    Loss of Expertise & Experience.

The historical Incident data shown in the table (right) clearly demonstrates that MRCCs scheduled to close are the busiest with extremely competent and highly experienced staff.

Latest incident figures show that closing stations are experiencing increases of up to 12% for 2011.

MCA Annual Canoe & Kayak Report for 2010 (issued Jun 2011)

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2010_canoe_and_kayak_incident_report_kp_rev_1-2.pdf

This report clearly indicates the closing stations have the highest number of this type of incident.

A similar picture is also given in the MCA 2010 Diving Incident Annual Report. http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2010_diving_report.pdf     The report contains this statement…

“the district with the highest individual total is Portland having the single highest recorded

number of diving incidents totalling 41, not surprising when you consider that Portland is one of the most popular diving areas in the country.”

MCA data gives irrifutable evidence of incident knowledge & experience that will be lost when these stations close.

3.    Early closure of MRCCs before MOC running or proven.

On 22nd November 2011 in the House of Commons, Mike Penning stated in reply to Sheryl Murray MP “no centres will close before the robustness of the system is demonstrated. Should there be any blips in the system, I can assure my hon. Friend that no station will close until we have the level of resilience that we do not have today”.

Link to transcript/formal record:

Commons Hansard: Statement on coastguard modernisation

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111122/debtext/111122-0001.htm#11112278000001

Link to official TV recording of HoC session:

http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9416&st=15:34:40

Forth now due to close 28th September 2012 along with Clyde in December, which will have an impact on the gathering of local knowledge for the database and leave inadequate time for remaining stations to become acquainted with the areas they are going to be responsible for. (See Pairing)

At the same HoC session both Charles Kennedy MP & Richard Drax MP requested assurances regarding MOC ability to be proven. While, Paul Maynard MP requested that there was not a “Cliff edge changeover” between existing MRCCs closing and MOC becoming fully operational & proven.

Any closure of MRCC will further damage moral, overload the service which is already stretched. This may prove extremely costly in time, finances and possibly lives.

4.    Language & dialect issues.

MCA FOI Request F0001014 the following reply was received:

“In respect of the use of the Welsh language during distress calls the Maritime and Coastguard Agency does not hold the information you have requested as HM Coastguard does not record which language was used by a caller during a distress call.

In respect if the tasking of RNLI Lifeboats I can advise that English is used as it is the International language for all Search and Rescue missions; Standard Marine Communications Phrases are used.”

Similarly a response by the RNLI Press Office (Roger Aldham)

“I had a quick chat this morning with some colleagues inWales; however no one can think of any particular incidents where pronouncing place names was a problem.  I suggest you also contact the coastguard inWalesas they co-ordinate almost all of the incidents we launch to and may be able to better answer your query. “

It is clear that language & dialect are a consideration, familiarity with place names is important for every station.

Local names can be mispronounced by anyone not familiar to the area, underlining the importance of all stations.

If the MCA seriously accepts that the ability to speak Welsh/Gaelic is a primary factor in keeping any MRCC open, then it must accept equal importance of every MRCC’s ability to recognise dialect and local phraseology for places, names and topography references.

5.    Pairing Fiction. The following statement can be found in the document….

Future Coastguard Consultation Exercise Equality Impact Assessment (EqIA)

“Each MRCC operates as the coordination centre for a defined geographical area. A measure of resilience is provided by the organisation of the 19 centres into 9 pairings (with Dover/Thames also being linked toLondon).

This resilience is however limited to providing cover for a proportion of resources across the pairing. With the exception of Aberdeen, MRCCs are neither staffed nor equipped to provide full cover across a pairing.”

Document link:
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=pairing%20site%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.dft.gov.uk%2Fmca%2F%20&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dft.gov.uk%2Fmca%2Feqia_consultation_exercise-2.doc&ei=F-3iT8zFIsjA0QXE7NSgAw&usg=AFQjCNFDpUXePHebDY0oM8K0NdJrzfgCRw

The above public document is further backed up by leaked minutes of…

Notes from Maritime Operations (MarOps) CSMs Maritime Meeting

Held at Spring Place on the 25 January 2012

Some Paired stations report they have not paired since trials in 2005, whereas others have failed to Pair due to technical incompatibilities even though they are due to close soon.

These prove that the current plan is based on Dangerous Assumptions of operational procedures which are unfounded; the whole modernisation plan is flawed and requires immediate suspension of all closures & an independent review.

6.    Unreasonable workloads.

With reference to both Ref.2 (Loss of Expertise & Experience) and Ref.7 below, staffing levels are currently at the lowest for quite some time but workloads are increasing.

Incident numbers are rising by up to 12% from the 2011 figures released under MCA FOI F0001010; this year’s figures are likely to show another sharp rise of incidents as one closing MRCC experienced 54 incidents in a weekend where the monthly average was 100.

Contributing factors cited are increase in Severe Weather events and more people utilisingUKholiday/leisure than before.

7.    Staff morale at all time low.

In the Second Consultation document entitled “Protecting our Seas and Shores in the 21st Century “, the quoted number of HM Coastguard staff at all MRCCs in Section 2 (Original consultation Proposals) was quoted as 491.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/110722_condoc2_v11_2_url.pdf

The same document above also sets out the minimum staffing levels for 8 of the remaining MRCCs as 23. It can be seen; therefore that the recorded staff levels for 8 existing MRCCs is short of the minimum.

The 2011 total was 85 staff short of the 491.

Organisation 1 May 2010 31 October 2011 Change
Aberdeen MRCC 29.00 25.50 -3.50
Belfast MRCC 21.14 21.14 0.00
Brixham MRCC 23.00 20.50 -2.50
Clyde MRCC 28.14 27.57 -0.57
Dover MRCC 31.00 26.00 -5.00
Falmouth MRCC 27.00 25.00 -2.00
Forth MRCC 15.00 14.00 -1.00
Holyhead MRCC 22.00 23.00 1.00
Humber MRCC 27.00 25.00 -2.00
Liverpool MRCC 21.50 20.50 -1.00
London Coastguard 7.00 11.00 4.00
Milford MRCC 24.00 23.00 -1.00
Portland MRCC 25.14 22.14 -3.00
Shetland MRCC 24.14 18.14 -6.00
Solent MRCC 28.65 25.65 -3.00
Stornoway MRCC 21.22 23.15 1.93
Swansea MRCC 27.00 22.00 -5.00
Thames MRCC 22.00 19.00 -3.00
Yarmouth MRCC 23.02 19.78 -3.24
Grand total 446.95 412.07

Figures in table (right) were extracted from the parliament publication linked below.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0001.htm

There are plenty of media reports covering the dire staff shortages within HM Coastguard service, which extremely worrying, with one source quoting 163 Operational Coastguard Officers short across the service. (June 2012)

Staff at closing MRCCs have publicly expressed that many will not transfer to remaining stations due to a variety of reasons like distance & loss of faith in the service.  This will lead to a ‘Cliff Edge’

once stations start closing and may render the service incapable of dealing with multiple incidents of any kind.

8.    Real flaws in MCA/HMCG plan not being addressed.

According to one consultation FOI answer, there were nearly 2 instances a month in 2010 where MRCCs lost communications or systems. Average downtime was 5Hours 10mins

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2010_to_date.pdf

With a similar picture from the 2009 report.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2009.pdf

A worrying trend is that average downtime is increasing.

Technology infrastructure has shown to have an average of 17 faults per month for the 2010 BT Wide Area Network log found in the following link.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2009.pdf

Press article showing blackouts can be caused by crime – in this case 3 hours lost due to a problem with BT exchange

http://www.cable.co.uk/news/bt-outage-causes-communications-blackout-for-shetland-coastguards-801390143/

The key word for the Modernisation Plan was ‘Resilience’ (ability to recover readily from illness, depression, adversity, or the like; buoyancy.); it is a major concern that the reduction (by 50%) of MRCCs actually removes resilience from the system. The greater number of centres means the less likely that any system failures will have an adverse effect on the emergency response.

The lower the number of control centres equates to less resilience in the system, as failure points become more critical having larger impact on the whole system.

All technology depends upon infrastructure integrity, which has power supply as the biggest weakness. It is well known that National Grid supply failures are on the increase as demand rises, reserve capacity is at an all time low and severe weather events are more frequent.

There will be more system failure like the one reported recently in the press; it’s only a matter of time before it coincides with an incident where lives are at risk.

http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/2663-coastguards-loss

9.    Incident handovers

On the 20th July 2009 the Fishing Vessel MV Aquila capsized with the loss of 3 crew.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry by the Sheriff concluded that although there was nothing that could have prevented the tragedy, there were lessons to be learnt by Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) & HM Coastguard (HMCG) in respect of delays and mistakes that were made.

The report is here:    http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2012FAI22.html

My assessment & summary of the Sheriff’s report:

  1. There was initial doubt over the incident location due to duplicate place names even though the 999 caller gave precise location details.
  2. The original MRCC taking the 999 call & initiating the response assumed responsibility for the incident but then decided to pass to a nearer MRCC.
  3. The original MRCC failed to follow through with vital information when handing over to another MRCC due to high workload.
  4. Mayday protocol was broken which failed to ensure all vessels in the area were properly updated & therefore may not have been aware to respond.
  5. Inadequate staffing levels at the nearest MRCC who assumed responsibility, failed to advise of the shortages before incident handover.
  6. The experience & training of staff at the nearest MRCC were inadequate through lack of training in vital areas such as Risk Assessing incidents.
  7. The assuming MRCC staff were overstretched & unable to fulfil the requirement of a Search Plan. (this danger has increased significantly with current staff losses.)

The current modernisation plan requires frequent passing of incidents from MOC to MRCC with local knowledge or specialism in incident type, which according to the Inquiry recommendation should not happen, as mistakes are made as in (b & c).

10.      Lack of Individual Risk Assessments

The Maritime Coastguard Agency made some attempt to evaluate Risk by producing a generalised Assessment. However, the result was a poorly constructed process with the documentation disjointed and difficult to follow. In particular Solution failed to adequately justify the Mitigation and lost sight of the fact that failure (however low the percentage of risk) will result in loss of life.

Post Consultation Risk Assessment here:

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/supporting_documentation_final.pdf

The process of Risk Assessment should be straight forward, by breaking down into simple understood hazards & risk with proper solutions with the emphasis on Risk removal not reduction.  Risk reduction to the letter of the law “requirement is to reduce risk using reasonably practical measures“

UK Law requires that individual Risk Assessments are done on the basis that each MRCC will have already done local Risk Assessments. These Risks remain in place regardless of the station staying open or not. It is therefore incumbent on MCA to evaluate each of these Risks against closing stations, as each MRCC may have differing Risk profiles. Additionally each closing station will have to be considered on known future impacts to Risk.

Note: It is a fact that the H&S at work act was further strengthened by Management of H&S Regs1999; which covers the explicit need to consider changes made to practices that affect the Public.

Failure to meet the requirement for comprehensive Risk Assessment of MRCC closures has been the subject of much debate within many areas including Welsh & Scottish Governments, where there have been calls for devolved responsibility to them for Coastguard activities & SOLAS commitment.

Written by Coastal Joe

 

Responsibility and culpability

20. June 2012 · 2 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

On 20th September last year (on a different blog), I wrote a post called ‘SOS – Save Our Souls – Please’.  The post was about the withdrawal of the four tugs that protect this Island of ours. It went on to discuss the closure of the Coastguard Stations at Brixham, Clyde, Forth, Liverpool, Portland, Swansea, Thames and Yarmouth. This was my first post on the subject and I was quite naive in my knowledge of the working of the whole organisation. Now, I know some of the people involved with the Coastguard and have been privileged to meet them. What a great bunch of girls and guys they are too ~ passionate about what they do, full of integrity, open & generous, and with lifetimes of local knowledge.

And therein lies the challenge or, the spin of the Government and the Maritime & Coastguard Agency! Mike Penning, the Transport Minister, lives in the landlocked constituency of Hemel Hempstead and is responsible for these decisions.

Under the previous government, The Fire Service was offered a newly built Call Centre Headquarters Building in Fareham, where all the emergency calls would be routed and then they would alert the local Fire Stations for them to go where needed.  The Fire Service gave much consideration to the proposal but decided to turn it down, believing a national call centre would be unable to serve the needs of local incidents across the country. Common sense and responsibility won out, but what to do with this nice shiny new building?

I haven’t gone off at a tangent, as the horrible truth is that they are going to make it the headquarters of the Coastguard. Now, I defy anyone to explain the logic of this to me – there is no logic. Nothing could explain why, just ponder on the following statement.

A national call centre for the fire service is unworkable, even though they have shires, towns, villages, roads, signs and postal codes to go by. But a national call centre for the coastguard has the go ahead even though there are no roads, postcodes and signs to go by, just coastlines, rocks and waves. This is a humongous mistake that will end in tears.

The Coastguard_SOS campaign has written to each and every single Member of Parliament to ask them to state whether they are for or against the cuts; in fact they have all been asked several times. The total number of MPs is 650, the number of responses received so far is 196. Pathetic! The facts of who has been responsible and courteous enough to reply can be seen on the page called ‘What your MP thinks’. The table shows who has answered, who has not answered and who has ignored a direct question. Makes for interesting reading! The MPs are elected to represent their constituencies and constituents, so you would imagine that each MP responsible for a coastal area would be passionately against the cuts, especially where one of the closures would be responsible for their area; but no, that is not the case! I was at Portcullis House, the Houses of Parliament in January, with Dennis O’Connor and Graham Warlow, for a meeting with Chair of the Transport Select Committee; Louise Ellman, MP. Whilst waiting, Dr Liam Fox, the MP for North Somerset (where incidents are handled by Swansea Coastguard Station and which is due for closure), was walking past and Graham stopped him to ask some questions. Dr Fox actually said he had no knowledge of the plans to close some Coastguard Stations, especially Swansea and that would affect his constituency. He went on to say that he would look into it.  Have a look, he has said YES to the closures!  As did quite a few other Conservative MPs who are responsible for coastal areas.

Had the procedures been followed correctly and had the consultations included risk assessments then there may have been an iota of responsibility and accountability with it, but, alas, no. In fact, the Welsh Government wrote and asked for a risk assessment to be done as they are very concerned by what is planned.  We are informed that this request has been refused. As well as asking the MPs if they were for or against the planned closures, we have also pointed out to every single one of them that no risk assessments had been done on individual stations and asked if they were prepared to allow it to proceed on that basis. The Maritime and Coastal Agency (MCA) and, Mike Penning, MP, the Minister responsible, have remained silent on this topic. Yet one MP, Therese Coffey (Suffolk Coast), recently claimed that risk assessments had been done on the closure plan which now includes the call centre at Farham.. If they have been done, why have they not been published? We know from a freedom of information request that no money has been spent on independent experts, so why should we believe any risk assessments exist. Of course it would also be only natural for us to question the impartiality and expertise of those involved in carrying out any risk assessments.

These days, there are many ‘celebrities’ and footballers who consider themselves important. Makes me laugh!  MPs do it as well, ha! Truth is, the important people, the real heroes, are those who give their time helping others. Those who make a difference, who save lives – Coastguards and the Lifeboat volunteers, they’re right up there on the list of inspirational heroes. And it is down to the MPs and the MCA to make sure these girls and guys are treated with respect and the very best of locations, training and equipment available.

The training, well – pots and kettles come to mind. The Coastguards have had a gagging order put on them since the closures were announced, I doubt many people realise this! It is very frightening and definitely Orwellian! Some of the Coastguards have made ‘waves’ and seem to have been moved from their posts or retired. All done with the stealth and secrecy of a dictatorship.  It is criminal that the powers to be have not listened to all the concerns that have been voiced and have refused the request by the Welsh Government to carry out an independent risk assessment. It is criminal that they have sent the first closure order to Forth Coastguard, telling them they will be closing on 28th September 2012 even though the call centre in Fareham is still far from operational. This just increases the risks involved to the ‘end users’ of the service and further discredits the so called ‘modernisation’ plan. Throughout this debacle, the Coastguards have acted with integrity and professionalism, they have my complete respect.

When the eight Coastguard stations are closed and all the local knowledge therein is lost, and when crucial time is wasted going through a central call centre, I do hope the MPs, who either supported the cuts (or ignored the question put to them), and the upper echelons of the MCA, will understand that they will be jointly culpable along with the current transport minister, Mike Penning, MP, and Prime Minister David Cameron. When souls are lost as a result of the closures, we will hold them to account.

Written by Lynne Gray

 

Different views

11. June 2012 · Write a comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

As has been said in previous posts, we want to discuss the closures of HM Coastguard Regional Coordination Centres with as many people as possible and we try to understand the questions and different points of view, and give the most straightforward, and always honest, answers and explanations.

There was a Tweet from Adam Wright @ambuadam the other day…

https://twitter.com/ambuadam/status/210198911455989760

Now translated from abbreviated ‘Twitter speak’ the tweet was as follows:

“Coastguard stations are going nowhere! Control rooms are closing. Local Rescue teams are getting better kit & training. They are the real local knowledge”

This was his response to a tweet about loss of Local Knowledge with the closure of 50% of MRCCs (Maritime Regional Coordination Centres).

My subsequent responses to him were not acknowledged or answered in anyway.

For the sake of clarity I hope to answer the above view on closures because this seems to be one of the arguments made by those that have been ‘sold’ the current Modernisation Plan for HMCG.

  1. Yes Stations are going nowhere, many of the stations that are targeted in the cuts are not actually closing. They are being made into Regional centres for the Local Coastguard Volunteers that perform the shore based rescues (Cliff, Mud etc).

This begs the question of “where is the supposed cost saving, if most aren’t physically closing?” We shall have to leave that to (perhaps) a later post that looks at that area!

  1. Local Rescue teams are getting better kit & training.

Great, I have no problem with that except they should already be getting the best kit & training.

It would appear that this is a divisive strategy to alienate the relationship between the Local rescue groups and the Regional Control rooms. Why should one part of the service be cut to fund another when they are equally important frontline services… it makes no practical, logical or operational sense.

Any SAR service either paid or voluntary should have the best training & equipment to carry out their duties to the best of their ability. Anything less is a failure in Duty of Care as well as breaking Health & Safety Law (Risks identified can only be mitigated by the safest procedures & equipment within reasonable implementation & cost).

  1. They (Local Rescue teams) are the real local knowledge.

Now this is the big issue for many people… ‘local knowledge’, yes I agree that the Rescue Teams all have fantastic local knowledge and can use it to respond to any incident when they are tasked to do so by whichever control centre.

However, they may not be the ones answering the phone/radio/beacon alert or taking the initial report from whatever source.

When MRCCs are closed the plan will be that a National Call Centre (MOC) will take all Coastguard 999 calls.

The key in tasking the correct response is the initial report which needs the most accurate location information of the casualty. Often this is time critical.

With modern technology there can be some indication of where the report has come from, however this is not always accurate due to mobile phone signals reception, VHF radio signal strength, with newness of an area to the person calling or even problems with pronunciation of place names.

The first respondent (person making the call) has to describe accurately where the incident is. The existing MRCCs have sufficient knowledge of their area to pick up on description references to make use of the information.

With the MOC, the call centre staff will be trained to use a computer that holds the place names from around theUKcoastline (19,500 Miles)*. Reliance on such computerised systems demands 100% reliability and extremely accurate database cataloguing.  (The track record for electronic system reliability indicates that failures will regularly happen.)

Local Knowledge has been pivotal to the campaign against closure of MRCC’s because the current knowledge held by the Regional Centres has proven to work in a majority of incidents. Success on a daily basis is why Coastguards are tested on their competency of Local knowledge every two years.

The plan for closure of MRCCs is happening; they will close before the new Call centre is set-up. The local knowledge that saves lives today will probably be lost along with the experienced staff that used it every day.

The new Call Centre is based on a theory with no operational proof. The national database of place names & locations does not yet exist.

There is only one description for this situation; ‘Gambling’ with the lives of the public!

This view is not held only by one person alone but hundreds if not thousands of people, some of whom know the Coastguard profession extremely well, because they work in it or work with it.

HAVE WE CLARIFIED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘LOCAL KNOWLEDGE’ ISSUE?

WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS ISSUE?

*Taken from the Cartography website http://www.cartography.org.uk/default.asp?contentID=749

 

Written by Coastal Joe.

The hidden costs of fish and chips

15. May 2012 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

The fishing industry has had a very difficult time over the last decade, with extra pressures on those out at sea trying to survive, both economically and physically.

An increase in extreme weather events brought on by changing climate conditions gives rise to dangers already inherent in the industry.
In 2010 there were 12 fishing vessels lost in UK waters (source Marine Accident Investigation Branch MAIB Annual Report 2010), with significant loss of life.

256 fishermen died due to accidents to/on UK fishing vessels between 1992 – 2006, according to the MAIB report ‘Analysis of UK Fishing Vessel Safety 1992 to 2006’ published in 2008.

According to the MCA report “Update of mortality for workers in the UK merchant shipping and fishing sectors”, fishermen were 115 times more likely to die than any other UK occupation during the statistical time period.

Despite, a large reduction of the UK fishing fleet, there is little evidence to suggest that the occupation has become much safer. Without more up to date statistics, it is difficult to judge but every year the industry sees tragedies.

Will closures of HM Coastguard Rescue Centres have an effect on the survival rate of Fishermen in the future?

One indication of this would be to look at where past tragedies have occurred and where the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres are located.

As can be seen from the map, there are many incidents in the areas covered by the closing MRCCs. With loss of Local Knowledge and possible delays in response times, this can only be negative for all concerned.  Below is a map showing the magnitude of fatalities by location.

Fishing Vessel Fatalit, there are many incidents in the areas covered by the closing MRCCs. With loss of Local Knowledge and possible delays in response times, this can only be negative for all concerned. Below is a map showing the magnitude of fatalities by location.

Information about the Role of HMCG:

HM Coastguard is the 999 service that is responsible for monitoring, and responding to, any Maritime incident anywhere around the UK and it also provides worldwide coordination for Maritime Rescue.

Currently there are 18 HMCG Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres that cover every area of UK waters. The Government has decided that costs can be saved by making radical changes to the structure of the service with the introduction of one UK wide “Call Centre” to handle all Coastguard 999 calls and closure of half the Rescue Centres so that remaining ones have at least double the workload.

Loss of vital local knowledge built up over generations will have a profound impact on the response of the service; many Coastguards know their “patch” quite intimately and instantly recognise place names which often do not appear in any publications.

Many coastal communities & organisations have made representations to the Government to call a stop to the closure plan as the savings are negligible (£0.01/tax payer/year), yet the risk to life of all Seafarers including our fishermen is considerable.

Next time you enjoy your Fish & Chips, spare a thought to the dangers that Fishermen face.

Consider joining the public run & led campaign to stop closure of HM Coastguard stations.

Sign the Petition and please visit the ‘How to help’ section of the website.

Written by Coastal Joe

 

The Aquila – lessons not learnt and DfT & MCA not listening!

29. March 2012 · 4 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

On the 20th July 2009 the Fishing Vessel MV Aquila capsized with the loss of three crew.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry by the Sherriff concluded that although there was nothing that could have prevented the tragedy, there were lessons to be learnt by Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) & HM Coastguard (HMCG) in respect of delays and mistakes that were made.

The report is here:  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2012FAI22.html

However, here are some extremely relevant points from the report that have a significant bearing on the current HM Coastguard ‘Modernisation Plan’, which intends to close up to 50% of the current 18 Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) & build a new National Maritime Operation Centre (MOC) to handle all 999 calls. Below is my assessment & summary of the report:

  1. There was initial doubt over the incident location due to duplicate place names even though the 999 caller gave precise location details.
  2. The original MRCC taking the 999 call & initiating the response assumed responsibility for the incident but then decided to pass to a nearer MRCC.
  3. The original MRCC failed to follow through with vital information when handing over to another MRCC.
  4. Mayday protocol was broken which failed to ensure all vessels in the area were properly advised & therefore respond immediately.
  5. The staffing levels at the nearest MRCC were inadequate.
  6. The experience & training of staff at the nearest MRCC were inadequate.
  7. MRCC staff were overstretched & unable to fulfil the requirement of a Search Plan.
  8. Senior HM Coastguard & MCA managers failed to support MRCC staff by allowing inadequacies and then further compounded this by showing little support to staff at the Inquest & subsequent revision of procedures/infrastructure.
  9. There are known areas of poor VHF Radio cover for Mayday communications.

Conclusions:

The MOC is destined to be a Call Centre of handlers with NO Coastguard experience due to insufficient staff (see Straight from the Horse’s Mouth blog), how any 999 operator can ensure proper incident location identification is impossible to comprehend, even when given accurate information as in (1).

The current modernisation plan requires frequent passing of incidents from MOC to MRCC with local knowledge or specialism in incident type, which according to the Inquiry recommendation should not happen, as mistakes are made as in (2 & 3).

The current modernisation plan requires remaining MRCC’s to double or quadruple the responsible areas that they have to deal with, which in turn will have a similar increase in workload. Given that some stations are already understaffed & poorly trained as in (5 & 6) poor decision making and mistakes are for more likely as in (3 & 4).

MCA & HMCG hierarchy /culture is failing to address the needs of staff with little evidence of embracing an improvement in relationships, staffing, training or procedures.(8)

The acceptance of poor radio coverage around the UK is intolerable with existing 18 MRCC’s but with half that number is downright dangerous, especially as the modernisation plan will be extremely reliant on remote monitoring. Eradication of Radio black spots needs to be a high priority.

There were some mistakes made by HM Coastguard in their handling of the MV Aquila tragedy, but the real problem here is that the Inquiry has made recommendation and points that are being ignored in the Modernisation  Plan.

How big a tragedy will it take before DfT & MCA listen to the Judicial System?

Currently DfT & MCA are failing to listen to Maritime Safety Experts, their own Coastguards, Industry, some rescue crews and the Public.

What will it take for this modernisation plan to be stopped?

Formal finding recommendations of the Sherriff:

In terms of Section 6(1)(e) of the Act there are other factors which are relevant to the circumstances of the death.

(i)                  The Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) should be responsible for the tasking of all Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters. This will avoid the confusion, and subsequent delay resultant from that, caused by tasking of SAR helicopters by individual Coastguard stations.

(ii)                The Co-ordination and control of live incidents should be retained by the Initial Action Station. If transfer is appropriate for whatever reason, that transfer should be conducted following upon a full assessment of the location of the incident, the VHF radio coverage in the area of the incident and the staffing levels and capability in the respective stations. The Initial Station should retain control until all such checks have been carried out and it is agreed fully with the transfer station that they are prepared to accept the transfer. Any verbal transfer of co-ordination must be followed up as soon as possible with written confirmation of the transfer including full details of the incident and full reasons why the transfer is appropriate.

(iii)               The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) should review their training procedures to ensure that sufficient training is provided to watch managers and those who might act up as watch managers in Staff Planning and Risk Evaluation.

(iv)              Training is required to be given by the MCA to coastguard watch managers and officers in regard to the timing of the broadcast of Mayday relay signals, the circumstances in which such signals should be repeated and the circumstances in which a Mayday Silence should be broadcast.

 

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