Mike Penning “.. a regional structure will put lives at risk ..”

01. August 2012 · Write a comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

It is always gratifying when you read quotes from people who agree with the same principles you are fighting for.  So I ask you to read the following article, quoting Mike Penning and appearing on his web site.

Mike Penning

Labour cuts threaten fire safety across Hertfordshire

19th August 2005

Mike Penning, MP for Hemel Hempstead and a former fire fighter, today expressed his concern at the announcement by John Prescott’s Whitehall department that it is to shut down the local fire control room, replacing it with a distant regional call centre based in Cambridge.

These cuts to local fire services have occurred without any input from local people, and mean that 999 calls will be answered up to 100 miles away – by operators who have little knowledge of Hemel Hempstead and the surrounding villages. The restructuring process will cost a massive £72 million, re-diverting resources away from frontline protection.

Mike Penning asserted,

“Despite the rejection of regional government in November’s North East regional referendum, John Prescott is moving ahead with his expensive plans to create new regional fire quangos. This will mean the local fire control room will be shut down.

“As a former fire fighter I know from personal experience how a regional structure will put lives at risk, since 999 operators will have less knowledge of the Hemel Hempstead area The East of England region contains 5.4 million people, and covers a mammoth area of 19,000 sq km. Civil resilience could also be damaged by placing all our eggs in one basket. If the regional centre is forced offline by a disaster or attack, the whole emergency response will go down across a massive geographical area.

“I oppose this damaging regional agenda. I believe that fire and rescue authorities must remain close and accountable to local people. I fear that local fire stations could be next if distant regional politicians continue with their cuts. John Prescott’s regional empire building is playing politics with fire safety.”

A well presented argument for not using a regional structure for the fire service, with emphasis being put on the loss of local knowledge.  The building Mike Penning is talking about is a regional centre, not a national centre, such as Penning’s Folly, the newly proposed HQ for the Maritime Coastal Agency.

It was a strong, and successful, argument  for not having a regional call centre for the fire service.  And that was with the added bonus of people being able to use postcodes, street names and landmarks to identify where a fire was.

Now imagine the argument against having a national call centre for the Maritime Coastal Agency.  If this is Mr Penning’s view of a regional centre, why oh why, is he trying to push through a national centre for the Coastguard Service? All the above points made by Mike Penning, Shipping Minister, are absolutely spot on for keeping every single coastguard station and not playing politics with people’s safety at sea.  Even more so when you imagine the tides and currents taking people and boats a long way from the original incident site.  Oh yes, and there aren’t many street names to go by, nor postal codes nor buildings!  Cliffs and rocks, yes, everything else would be down to critical local knowledge.

So what has changed? Nothing,  just the names and the party in power!  But the wonderful thing about all this is that Mike Penning has given us the perfect argument against the cuts to the Coastguard Stations and this empire building.

Graham Warlow, ex Watch Manager,  has re-jigged the last two paragraphs to show how Mike Penning’ arguments are absolutely perfect for

Justine Greening

the Coastguard SOS team trying to save the Stations from closure.

As an ex Coastguard, I know from personal experience how a national structure will put lives at risk, since the operators will have less knowledge of the any area other than where they live. The fact that Mike Penning opposed a regional structure for the fire service because of an area the size of the East of England, covering a mammoth 19,000 square kilometres, makes the notion of a national centre, covering an area of 243,610 square kilometres (nearly thirteen times the size), as bordering on insanity! If the national centre is forced offline by a disaster or attack, the whole emergency response will go down across the whole of the United Kingdom.
I oppose this damaging national agenda. I believe the Coastguard and rescue authorities must remain close and accountable to local people. I fear that more local Coastguard stations could go if distant national politicians continue with their cuts. Justine Greening’s national empire building is playing politics with people’s lives.
Written by Lynne Gray

Concerns, contradictions & deceits re the closures of Coastguard Stations

29. June 2012 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Integrity, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

This following letter is to be given (by hand) to Mike Penning, the Minister responsible for the closure plans of Coastguard Stations. It highlights grave discrepancies between what is being said and the reality of matters. We sincerely hope that other MPs share the same qualities of integrity and honour that Paul Maynard does.

For the Attention of Paul Maynard MP

Ref. HM Coastguard  MRCC Closures (incl. Liverpool/Crosby)

25th June 2012

Dear Mr.  Maynard,

We have corresponded on this subject a number of times; I thank you for your prompt and diligent replies.

I am grateful therefore, for the opportunity that you have offered by taking my concerns directly to the Transport Minister Mike Penning, with your promise to ensure the matter gets full and fair consideration.

The attached document gives an outline of my concerns, the annex gives detailed information of those concerns stating the flaws in the plan and referenced documents.

I sincerely hope that once you have read this document you will fully back the call for closures to be halted.

You will be aware that these concerns are shared by many other people as the website www.coastguardsos.com proves. The campaign based on the website is led and run by members of the public, which I fully support.

I look forward to this opportunity and trust that it provides some way forward in resolving the major flaws in the MCA modernisation plan for HM Coastguard.

Yours faithfully,

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

 

The list below is a Summary of my concerns (they are not in any order), the appendix gives greater detail for each and references any corresponding evidence.

Concerns:

  1. Loss of local knowledge. There is no evidence that the ‘National Gazetteer‘ will be in place prior to any MRCC being closed. Majority of knowledge is held by the staff that are going to be lost before this system is in place or proven to be adequate in ‘real world’ incidents.
  2. Loss of Expertise & Experience. Many of the MRCCs that are to be closed have the highest incident rates and the majority of experienced staff will be lost.
  3. Early closure of MRCCs before MOC running or proven. There can be no cost justification for the early closure of MRCC when it is contrary to the explicit assurances made and risks compromising the whole modernisation strategy and more importantly the lives of people in the areas affected.
  4. Language & dialect issues. Much was made in the consultation process about retaining stations for the ability to speak e.g. Welsh. This has never had any operational basis.
  5. Pairing Fiction.  ‘Pairing’ between MRCCs is, in reality, (if it happens) it’s limited to switch over of 999 calls and monitoring of local VHF channels. Local Knowledge is NOT shared. Assurances were given on the basis that one of each pair could fully take over the others area, which is simply NOT TRUE.
  6. Unreasonable workloads. Remaining MRCCs will face unreasonable amounts of extra responsibility by taking on workloads which can equate to 4 or 5 times existing loads.
  7. Staff morale at all time low. Due to closures & item 6 there is an increase in all MRCCs being understaffed due to stress, sickness and staff leaving.
  8. Real flaws in MCA/HMCG plan not being addressed. Infrastructure has no proper resilience and as such will stop MOC from working.
  9. Incident handovers between MRCCs proven high risk, yet MOC system relies on process.
  10. Lack of Individual Risk Assessments as required by Law. There is no credible evidence that MCA has considered all the Risks associated with each closure. A blanket National Assessment is inadequate.

Summary

A U-Turn on closures of HM Coastguard MRCCs is urgently demanded.

There is significant evidence that gives compelling reasons for the current plan to be reconsidered.

The foundations of the modernisation plan were Pairing & Resilience; they no longer provide any credible basis for the plan.

Appendix

1.    Loss of local knowledge.

1a     Risk Overview table Ref. 6 Risk Mitigation states “No national standard Gazetteer” exists for Local Knowledge (document dated February 2011). http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2.risk_overview_table.pdf

1b    MCA response to Independent Review of 2nd Consultation “Local knowledge will be continuously gathered, stored and shared across MCA systems. This information will include alternative and multiple place names, including phonetic spelling and will be available, in a standard format, to all watch-keepers across the whole UK network.” http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/irt_response_table_v3.3.pdf

1c     See also Pairing in respect to “Retaining additional centres with one from each of the existing pairs and increasing to 24 hour coverage at all remaining stations will enable the current levels of local knowledge, local intelligence and familiarity with local languages, dialect and place names, to be transitioned into the new structure.”( From pdf referenced in 1b)

MCA documents (above) acknowledge the lack of a National Database for Local knowledge and promises to deliver such a system. Given the timeframe it will be impossible to implement a purpose written programme, any commercial system would need a fully quality controlled & verified customisation by trained experienced staff.

With imminent closure of MRCCs, much of this Local Knowledge will be lost before it can be added to the ‘National Gazetteer’, provided staff would be willing to add date prior to redundancy.

Ref.7 Local Knowledge – the Operational Context states

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/7.local_knowledge_the_operational_context.pdf

“Coastguard officers can still draw on detailed local knowledge by contacting a wide selection of coastal community based resources (CRS, RNLI, NCI, Harbour and port authorities etc.) for advice. “

However in an emergency situation this is hardly practical due to availability of such volunteer sources and will waste valuable time in any incident.

Justification for not keeping all MRCCs open was added cost of computer links/equipment to MOC; this prevents future updating of National Gazetteer and its interface with Master mapping data. Without access to the system, how can contributors ensure that the data is correctly entered? Without a Regional MRCC to audit any database (place names or maps/charts) how will it be properly audited? Any system depends on the quality of data to be effective.

HMCG has recognised the need for MRCCs at strategic places to provide an on-scene local service because of local risks, like the introduction of theLondonstation after the Marchioness disaster. Where is the proof that technology or working practices mitigate past requirements?

There are significant local variations to the National computer simulation software & planning, there are reports that prediction models do not fully cater for manmade influences on tide movement patterns.

2.    Loss of Expertise & Experience.

The historical Incident data shown in the table (right) clearly demonstrates that MRCCs scheduled to close are the busiest with extremely competent and highly experienced staff.

Latest incident figures show that closing stations are experiencing increases of up to 12% for 2011.

MCA Annual Canoe & Kayak Report for 2010 (issued Jun 2011)

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2010_canoe_and_kayak_incident_report_kp_rev_1-2.pdf

This report clearly indicates the closing stations have the highest number of this type of incident.

A similar picture is also given in the MCA 2010 Diving Incident Annual Report. http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2010_diving_report.pdf     The report contains this statement…

“the district with the highest individual total is Portland having the single highest recorded

number of diving incidents totalling 41, not surprising when you consider that Portland is one of the most popular diving areas in the country.”

MCA data gives irrifutable evidence of incident knowledge & experience that will be lost when these stations close.

3.    Early closure of MRCCs before MOC running or proven.

On 22nd November 2011 in the House of Commons, Mike Penning stated in reply to Sheryl Murray MP “no centres will close before the robustness of the system is demonstrated. Should there be any blips in the system, I can assure my hon. Friend that no station will close until we have the level of resilience that we do not have today”.

Link to transcript/formal record:

Commons Hansard: Statement on coastguard modernisation

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111122/debtext/111122-0001.htm#11112278000001

Link to official TV recording of HoC session:

http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9416&st=15:34:40

Forth now due to close 28th September 2012 along with Clyde in December, which will have an impact on the gathering of local knowledge for the database and leave inadequate time for remaining stations to become acquainted with the areas they are going to be responsible for. (See Pairing)

At the same HoC session both Charles Kennedy MP & Richard Drax MP requested assurances regarding MOC ability to be proven. While, Paul Maynard MP requested that there was not a “Cliff edge changeover” between existing MRCCs closing and MOC becoming fully operational & proven.

Any closure of MRCC will further damage moral, overload the service which is already stretched. This may prove extremely costly in time, finances and possibly lives.

4.    Language & dialect issues.

MCA FOI Request F0001014 the following reply was received:

“In respect of the use of the Welsh language during distress calls the Maritime and Coastguard Agency does not hold the information you have requested as HM Coastguard does not record which language was used by a caller during a distress call.

In respect if the tasking of RNLI Lifeboats I can advise that English is used as it is the International language for all Search and Rescue missions; Standard Marine Communications Phrases are used.”

Similarly a response by the RNLI Press Office (Roger Aldham)

“I had a quick chat this morning with some colleagues inWales; however no one can think of any particular incidents where pronouncing place names was a problem.  I suggest you also contact the coastguard inWalesas they co-ordinate almost all of the incidents we launch to and may be able to better answer your query. “

It is clear that language & dialect are a consideration, familiarity with place names is important for every station.

Local names can be mispronounced by anyone not familiar to the area, underlining the importance of all stations.

If the MCA seriously accepts that the ability to speak Welsh/Gaelic is a primary factor in keeping any MRCC open, then it must accept equal importance of every MRCC’s ability to recognise dialect and local phraseology for places, names and topography references.

5.    Pairing Fiction. The following statement can be found in the document….

Future Coastguard Consultation Exercise Equality Impact Assessment (EqIA)

“Each MRCC operates as the coordination centre for a defined geographical area. A measure of resilience is provided by the organisation of the 19 centres into 9 pairings (with Dover/Thames also being linked toLondon).

This resilience is however limited to providing cover for a proportion of resources across the pairing. With the exception of Aberdeen, MRCCs are neither staffed nor equipped to provide full cover across a pairing.”

Document link:
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=pairing%20site%3Ahttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.dft.gov.uk%2Fmca%2F%20&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dft.gov.uk%2Fmca%2Feqia_consultation_exercise-2.doc&ei=F-3iT8zFIsjA0QXE7NSgAw&usg=AFQjCNFDpUXePHebDY0oM8K0NdJrzfgCRw

The above public document is further backed up by leaked minutes of…

Notes from Maritime Operations (MarOps) CSMs Maritime Meeting

Held at Spring Place on the 25 January 2012

Some Paired stations report they have not paired since trials in 2005, whereas others have failed to Pair due to technical incompatibilities even though they are due to close soon.

These prove that the current plan is based on Dangerous Assumptions of operational procedures which are unfounded; the whole modernisation plan is flawed and requires immediate suspension of all closures & an independent review.

6.    Unreasonable workloads.

With reference to both Ref.2 (Loss of Expertise & Experience) and Ref.7 below, staffing levels are currently at the lowest for quite some time but workloads are increasing.

Incident numbers are rising by up to 12% from the 2011 figures released under MCA FOI F0001010; this year’s figures are likely to show another sharp rise of incidents as one closing MRCC experienced 54 incidents in a weekend where the monthly average was 100.

Contributing factors cited are increase in Severe Weather events and more people utilisingUKholiday/leisure than before.

7.    Staff morale at all time low.

In the Second Consultation document entitled “Protecting our Seas and Shores in the 21st Century “, the quoted number of HM Coastguard staff at all MRCCs in Section 2 (Original consultation Proposals) was quoted as 491.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/110722_condoc2_v11_2_url.pdf

The same document above also sets out the minimum staffing levels for 8 of the remaining MRCCs as 23. It can be seen; therefore that the recorded staff levels for 8 existing MRCCs is short of the minimum.

The 2011 total was 85 staff short of the 491.

Organisation 1 May 2010 31 October 2011 Change
Aberdeen MRCC 29.00 25.50 -3.50
Belfast MRCC 21.14 21.14 0.00
Brixham MRCC 23.00 20.50 -2.50
Clyde MRCC 28.14 27.57 -0.57
Dover MRCC 31.00 26.00 -5.00
Falmouth MRCC 27.00 25.00 -2.00
Forth MRCC 15.00 14.00 -1.00
Holyhead MRCC 22.00 23.00 1.00
Humber MRCC 27.00 25.00 -2.00
Liverpool MRCC 21.50 20.50 -1.00
London Coastguard 7.00 11.00 4.00
Milford MRCC 24.00 23.00 -1.00
Portland MRCC 25.14 22.14 -3.00
Shetland MRCC 24.14 18.14 -6.00
Solent MRCC 28.65 25.65 -3.00
Stornoway MRCC 21.22 23.15 1.93
Swansea MRCC 27.00 22.00 -5.00
Thames MRCC 22.00 19.00 -3.00
Yarmouth MRCC 23.02 19.78 -3.24
Grand total 446.95 412.07

Figures in table (right) were extracted from the parliament publication linked below.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0001.htm

There are plenty of media reports covering the dire staff shortages within HM Coastguard service, which extremely worrying, with one source quoting 163 Operational Coastguard Officers short across the service. (June 2012)

Staff at closing MRCCs have publicly expressed that many will not transfer to remaining stations due to a variety of reasons like distance & loss of faith in the service.  This will lead to a ‘Cliff Edge’

once stations start closing and may render the service incapable of dealing with multiple incidents of any kind.

8.    Real flaws in MCA/HMCG plan not being addressed.

According to one consultation FOI answer, there were nearly 2 instances a month in 2010 where MRCCs lost communications or systems. Average downtime was 5Hours 10mins

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2010_to_date.pdf

With a similar picture from the 2009 report.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2009.pdf

A worrying trend is that average downtime is increasing.

Technology infrastructure has shown to have an average of 17 faults per month for the 2010 BT Wide Area Network log found in the following link.

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/question_45_network_availability_centralised_coastguard_comm_grade_as_2009.pdf

Press article showing blackouts can be caused by crime – in this case 3 hours lost due to a problem with BT exchange

http://www.cable.co.uk/news/bt-outage-causes-communications-blackout-for-shetland-coastguards-801390143/

The key word for the Modernisation Plan was ‘Resilience’ (ability to recover readily from illness, depression, adversity, or the like; buoyancy.); it is a major concern that the reduction (by 50%) of MRCCs actually removes resilience from the system. The greater number of centres means the less likely that any system failures will have an adverse effect on the emergency response.

The lower the number of control centres equates to less resilience in the system, as failure points become more critical having larger impact on the whole system.

All technology depends upon infrastructure integrity, which has power supply as the biggest weakness. It is well known that National Grid supply failures are on the increase as demand rises, reserve capacity is at an all time low and severe weather events are more frequent.

There will be more system failure like the one reported recently in the press; it’s only a matter of time before it coincides with an incident where lives are at risk.

http://www.shetnews.co.uk/news/2663-coastguards-loss

9.    Incident handovers

On the 20th July 2009 the Fishing Vessel MV Aquila capsized with the loss of 3 crew.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry by the Sheriff concluded that although there was nothing that could have prevented the tragedy, there were lessons to be learnt by Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) & HM Coastguard (HMCG) in respect of delays and mistakes that were made.

The report is here:    http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2012FAI22.html

My assessment & summary of the Sheriff’s report:

  1. There was initial doubt over the incident location due to duplicate place names even though the 999 caller gave precise location details.
  2. The original MRCC taking the 999 call & initiating the response assumed responsibility for the incident but then decided to pass to a nearer MRCC.
  3. The original MRCC failed to follow through with vital information when handing over to another MRCC due to high workload.
  4. Mayday protocol was broken which failed to ensure all vessels in the area were properly updated & therefore may not have been aware to respond.
  5. Inadequate staffing levels at the nearest MRCC who assumed responsibility, failed to advise of the shortages before incident handover.
  6. The experience & training of staff at the nearest MRCC were inadequate through lack of training in vital areas such as Risk Assessing incidents.
  7. The assuming MRCC staff were overstretched & unable to fulfil the requirement of a Search Plan. (this danger has increased significantly with current staff losses.)

The current modernisation plan requires frequent passing of incidents from MOC to MRCC with local knowledge or specialism in incident type, which according to the Inquiry recommendation should not happen, as mistakes are made as in (b & c).

10.      Lack of Individual Risk Assessments

The Maritime Coastguard Agency made some attempt to evaluate Risk by producing a generalised Assessment. However, the result was a poorly constructed process with the documentation disjointed and difficult to follow. In particular Solution failed to adequately justify the Mitigation and lost sight of the fact that failure (however low the percentage of risk) will result in loss of life.

Post Consultation Risk Assessment here:

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/supporting_documentation_final.pdf

The process of Risk Assessment should be straight forward, by breaking down into simple understood hazards & risk with proper solutions with the emphasis on Risk removal not reduction.  Risk reduction to the letter of the law “requirement is to reduce risk using reasonably practical measures“

UK Law requires that individual Risk Assessments are done on the basis that each MRCC will have already done local Risk Assessments. These Risks remain in place regardless of the station staying open or not. It is therefore incumbent on MCA to evaluate each of these Risks against closing stations, as each MRCC may have differing Risk profiles. Additionally each closing station will have to be considered on known future impacts to Risk.

Note: It is a fact that the H&S at work act was further strengthened by Management of H&S Regs1999; which covers the explicit need to consider changes made to practices that affect the Public.

Failure to meet the requirement for comprehensive Risk Assessment of MRCC closures has been the subject of much debate within many areas including Welsh & Scottish Governments, where there have been calls for devolved responsibility to them for Coastguard activities & SOLAS commitment.

Written by Coastal Joe

 

Responsibility and culpability

20. June 2012 · 2 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea, Technology

On 20th September last year (on a different blog), I wrote a post called ‘SOS – Save Our Souls – Please’.  The post was about the withdrawal of the four tugs that protect this Island of ours. It went on to discuss the closure of the Coastguard Stations at Brixham, Clyde, Forth, Liverpool, Portland, Swansea, Thames and Yarmouth. This was my first post on the subject and I was quite naive in my knowledge of the working of the whole organisation. Now, I know some of the people involved with the Coastguard and have been privileged to meet them. What a great bunch of girls and guys they are too ~ passionate about what they do, full of integrity, open & generous, and with lifetimes of local knowledge.

And therein lies the challenge or, the spin of the Government and the Maritime & Coastguard Agency! Mike Penning, the Transport Minister, lives in the landlocked constituency of Hemel Hempstead and is responsible for these decisions.

Under the previous government, The Fire Service was offered a newly built Call Centre Headquarters Building in Fareham, where all the emergency calls would be routed and then they would alert the local Fire Stations for them to go where needed.  The Fire Service gave much consideration to the proposal but decided to turn it down, believing a national call centre would be unable to serve the needs of local incidents across the country. Common sense and responsibility won out, but what to do with this nice shiny new building?

I haven’t gone off at a tangent, as the horrible truth is that they are going to make it the headquarters of the Coastguard. Now, I defy anyone to explain the logic of this to me – there is no logic. Nothing could explain why, just ponder on the following statement.

A national call centre for the fire service is unworkable, even though they have shires, towns, villages, roads, signs and postal codes to go by. But a national call centre for the coastguard has the go ahead even though there are no roads, postcodes and signs to go by, just coastlines, rocks and waves. This is a humongous mistake that will end in tears.

The Coastguard_SOS campaign has written to each and every single Member of Parliament to ask them to state whether they are for or against the cuts; in fact they have all been asked several times. The total number of MPs is 650, the number of responses received so far is 196. Pathetic! The facts of who has been responsible and courteous enough to reply can be seen on the page called ‘What your MP thinks’. The table shows who has answered, who has not answered and who has ignored a direct question. Makes for interesting reading! The MPs are elected to represent their constituencies and constituents, so you would imagine that each MP responsible for a coastal area would be passionately against the cuts, especially where one of the closures would be responsible for their area; but no, that is not the case! I was at Portcullis House, the Houses of Parliament in January, with Dennis O’Connor and Graham Warlow, for a meeting with Chair of the Transport Select Committee; Louise Ellman, MP. Whilst waiting, Dr Liam Fox, the MP for North Somerset (where incidents are handled by Swansea Coastguard Station and which is due for closure), was walking past and Graham stopped him to ask some questions. Dr Fox actually said he had no knowledge of the plans to close some Coastguard Stations, especially Swansea and that would affect his constituency. He went on to say that he would look into it.  Have a look, he has said YES to the closures!  As did quite a few other Conservative MPs who are responsible for coastal areas.

Had the procedures been followed correctly and had the consultations included risk assessments then there may have been an iota of responsibility and accountability with it, but, alas, no. In fact, the Welsh Government wrote and asked for a risk assessment to be done as they are very concerned by what is planned.  We are informed that this request has been refused. As well as asking the MPs if they were for or against the planned closures, we have also pointed out to every single one of them that no risk assessments had been done on individual stations and asked if they were prepared to allow it to proceed on that basis. The Maritime and Coastal Agency (MCA) and, Mike Penning, MP, the Minister responsible, have remained silent on this topic. Yet one MP, Therese Coffey (Suffolk Coast), recently claimed that risk assessments had been done on the closure plan which now includes the call centre at Farham.. If they have been done, why have they not been published? We know from a freedom of information request that no money has been spent on independent experts, so why should we believe any risk assessments exist. Of course it would also be only natural for us to question the impartiality and expertise of those involved in carrying out any risk assessments.

These days, there are many ‘celebrities’ and footballers who consider themselves important. Makes me laugh!  MPs do it as well, ha! Truth is, the important people, the real heroes, are those who give their time helping others. Those who make a difference, who save lives – Coastguards and the Lifeboat volunteers, they’re right up there on the list of inspirational heroes. And it is down to the MPs and the MCA to make sure these girls and guys are treated with respect and the very best of locations, training and equipment available.

The training, well – pots and kettles come to mind. The Coastguards have had a gagging order put on them since the closures were announced, I doubt many people realise this! It is very frightening and definitely Orwellian! Some of the Coastguards have made ‘waves’ and seem to have been moved from their posts or retired. All done with the stealth and secrecy of a dictatorship.  It is criminal that the powers to be have not listened to all the concerns that have been voiced and have refused the request by the Welsh Government to carry out an independent risk assessment. It is criminal that they have sent the first closure order to Forth Coastguard, telling them they will be closing on 28th September 2012 even though the call centre in Fareham is still far from operational. This just increases the risks involved to the ‘end users’ of the service and further discredits the so called ‘modernisation’ plan. Throughout this debacle, the Coastguards have acted with integrity and professionalism, they have my complete respect.

When the eight Coastguard stations are closed and all the local knowledge therein is lost, and when crucial time is wasted going through a central call centre, I do hope the MPs, who either supported the cuts (or ignored the question put to them), and the upper echelons of the MCA, will understand that they will be jointly culpable along with the current transport minister, Mike Penning, MP, and Prime Minister David Cameron. When souls are lost as a result of the closures, we will hold them to account.

Written by Lynne Gray

 

Different views

11. June 2012 · Write a comment · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

As has been said in previous posts, we want to discuss the closures of HM Coastguard Regional Coordination Centres with as many people as possible and we try to understand the questions and different points of view, and give the most straightforward, and always honest, answers and explanations.

There was a Tweet from Adam Wright @ambuadam the other day…

https://twitter.com/ambuadam/status/210198911455989760

Now translated from abbreviated ‘Twitter speak’ the tweet was as follows:

“Coastguard stations are going nowhere! Control rooms are closing. Local Rescue teams are getting better kit & training. They are the real local knowledge”

This was his response to a tweet about loss of Local Knowledge with the closure of 50% of MRCCs (Maritime Regional Coordination Centres).

My subsequent responses to him were not acknowledged or answered in anyway.

For the sake of clarity I hope to answer the above view on closures because this seems to be one of the arguments made by those that have been ‘sold’ the current Modernisation Plan for HMCG.

  1. Yes Stations are going nowhere, many of the stations that are targeted in the cuts are not actually closing. They are being made into Regional centres for the Local Coastguard Volunteers that perform the shore based rescues (Cliff, Mud etc).

This begs the question of “where is the supposed cost saving, if most aren’t physically closing?” We shall have to leave that to (perhaps) a later post that looks at that area!

  1. Local Rescue teams are getting better kit & training.

Great, I have no problem with that except they should already be getting the best kit & training.

It would appear that this is a divisive strategy to alienate the relationship between the Local rescue groups and the Regional Control rooms. Why should one part of the service be cut to fund another when they are equally important frontline services… it makes no practical, logical or operational sense.

Any SAR service either paid or voluntary should have the best training & equipment to carry out their duties to the best of their ability. Anything less is a failure in Duty of Care as well as breaking Health & Safety Law (Risks identified can only be mitigated by the safest procedures & equipment within reasonable implementation & cost).

  1. They (Local Rescue teams) are the real local knowledge.

Now this is the big issue for many people… ‘local knowledge’, yes I agree that the Rescue Teams all have fantastic local knowledge and can use it to respond to any incident when they are tasked to do so by whichever control centre.

However, they may not be the ones answering the phone/radio/beacon alert or taking the initial report from whatever source.

When MRCCs are closed the plan will be that a National Call Centre (MOC) will take all Coastguard 999 calls.

The key in tasking the correct response is the initial report which needs the most accurate location information of the casualty. Often this is time critical.

With modern technology there can be some indication of where the report has come from, however this is not always accurate due to mobile phone signals reception, VHF radio signal strength, with newness of an area to the person calling or even problems with pronunciation of place names.

The first respondent (person making the call) has to describe accurately where the incident is. The existing MRCCs have sufficient knowledge of their area to pick up on description references to make use of the information.

With the MOC, the call centre staff will be trained to use a computer that holds the place names from around theUKcoastline (19,500 Miles)*. Reliance on such computerised systems demands 100% reliability and extremely accurate database cataloguing.  (The track record for electronic system reliability indicates that failures will regularly happen.)

Local Knowledge has been pivotal to the campaign against closure of MRCC’s because the current knowledge held by the Regional Centres has proven to work in a majority of incidents. Success on a daily basis is why Coastguards are tested on their competency of Local knowledge every two years.

The plan for closure of MRCCs is happening; they will close before the new Call centre is set-up. The local knowledge that saves lives today will probably be lost along with the experienced staff that used it every day.

The new Call Centre is based on a theory with no operational proof. The national database of place names & locations does not yet exist.

There is only one description for this situation; ‘Gambling’ with the lives of the public!

This view is not held only by one person alone but hundreds if not thousands of people, some of whom know the Coastguard profession extremely well, because they work in it or work with it.

HAVE WE CLARIFIED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘LOCAL KNOWLEDGE’ ISSUE?

WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS ISSUE?

*Taken from the Cartography website http://www.cartography.org.uk/default.asp?contentID=749

 

Written by Coastal Joe.

Diving in the UK – dangers ahead

01. June 2012 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, Common Sense, Environment, Government

I can’t say I know much about diving, there are friends & family that participate, but I only know what they tell me.

The pastime is becoming more popular and, in theory, it is much safer than ever before, but accidents happen. More people enjoying diving from a wide range of age groups also means a greater risk of illness related incidents can arise.

From the 2010 MCA (Maritime Coastguard Agency) Report on Diving Incidents, I have found the following information:

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/2010_diving_report.pdf

The yearly average is 194 incidents over the 19 year span. It is a shame that the report does not look into any factors that may affect tends or influences.

I am drawn to the report statement, that follows…

“the district with the highest individual total is Portland having the single highest recorded number of diving incidents totalling 41, not surprising when you consider that Portland is one of the most popular diving areas in the country.”

Yet, this MRCC (Portland) is set to close along with the 9 others in the 2nd chart below.

As I have read many MCA Reports, some of which feature in previous Blogs, I am struck by the compelling evidence that that MRCC’s are NOT being closed for any Operational reasons.

It is quite obvious from MCA’s own data that the busiest most experienced stations are the casualties to Political aims and nothing whatsoever to do with any form of Modernisation or improvement.

Of the 232 incidents there were 12 fatalities.

Over 66% of incidents occur in MRCC areas that are to be closed.

If or When the MRCC’s do close, there will be greater dangers facing anyone in need of help from HM Coastguard, especially as the MCA report had the following comment:

“The greatest single incident type remains decompression illness (DCI) accounting for 66 incidents alone with a further 32 attributed to rapid ascent”

DCI incidents are extremely time critical, therefore need assistance in the shortest possible time. This may not be achievable from the remaining MRCC, as they on the whole have the least amount of Diving related experience and like the MOC (Maritime Operation Centre) that will act as the National call centre; the local knowledge* of where each wreck/dive site is may not be instantly recognisable. Tasking of appropriate local response could be delayed.*

*MCA’s own documents record the difficulties in having a central database for all UK locations & place names due to incompatibilities in the way records are stored at each MRCC. No formal plan to rectify this has been put in place at the time of writing & many MRCCs will close before one can be instigated.

Summary: There is NO operational basis for the Closures, this is a Political exercise that has scant regard for lives that are being put at risk.

Written by Coastal Joe

The hidden costs of fish and chips

15. May 2012 · 1 comment · Categories: Coastguards, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

The fishing industry has had a very difficult time over the last decade, with extra pressures on those out at sea trying to survive, both economically and physically.

An increase in extreme weather events brought on by changing climate conditions gives rise to dangers already inherent in the industry.
In 2010 there were 12 fishing vessels lost in UK waters (source Marine Accident Investigation Branch MAIB Annual Report 2010), with significant loss of life.

256 fishermen died due to accidents to/on UK fishing vessels between 1992 – 2006, according to the MAIB report ‘Analysis of UK Fishing Vessel Safety 1992 to 2006’ published in 2008.

According to the MCA report “Update of mortality for workers in the UK merchant shipping and fishing sectors”, fishermen were 115 times more likely to die than any other UK occupation during the statistical time period.

Despite, a large reduction of the UK fishing fleet, there is little evidence to suggest that the occupation has become much safer. Without more up to date statistics, it is difficult to judge but every year the industry sees tragedies.

Will closures of HM Coastguard Rescue Centres have an effect on the survival rate of Fishermen in the future?

One indication of this would be to look at where past tragedies have occurred and where the HM Coastguard Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres are located.

As can be seen from the map, there are many incidents in the areas covered by the closing MRCCs. With loss of Local Knowledge and possible delays in response times, this can only be negative for all concerned.  Below is a map showing the magnitude of fatalities by location.

Fishing Vessel Fatalit, there are many incidents in the areas covered by the closing MRCCs. With loss of Local Knowledge and possible delays in response times, this can only be negative for all concerned. Below is a map showing the magnitude of fatalities by location.

Information about the Role of HMCG:

HM Coastguard is the 999 service that is responsible for monitoring, and responding to, any Maritime incident anywhere around the UK and it also provides worldwide coordination for Maritime Rescue.

Currently there are 18 HMCG Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres that cover every area of UK waters. The Government has decided that costs can be saved by making radical changes to the structure of the service with the introduction of one UK wide “Call Centre” to handle all Coastguard 999 calls and closure of half the Rescue Centres so that remaining ones have at least double the workload.

Loss of vital local knowledge built up over generations will have a profound impact on the response of the service; many Coastguards know their “patch” quite intimately and instantly recognise place names which often do not appear in any publications.

Many coastal communities & organisations have made representations to the Government to call a stop to the closure plan as the savings are negligible (£0.01/tax payer/year), yet the risk to life of all Seafarers including our fishermen is considerable.

Next time you enjoy your Fish & Chips, spare a thought to the dangers that Fishermen face.

Consider joining the public run & led campaign to stop closure of HM Coastguard stations.

Sign the Petition and please visit the ‘How to help’ section of the website.

Written by Coastal Joe

 

5 Minutes!

02. April 2012 · 8 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

There is a small band fighting the proposed closures of (up to 50%) HM Coastguard Maritime Regional Coordination Centres (MRCC). I have been helping for a short time but many have been doing this since it was first announced in December 2010.

The amazing thing is: they do this… in their own time…… at their own expense! It would appear that this dedication is sometimes limited and this could be the most influential reason that there are only a few stalwarts that continue the work. Although we continue to grow with the occasional new SOS Crew member, we still seek to spread the word to more people.

Our aims are:

- To get the New Petition on the website up to 100,000 signatures.

- To raise awareness of the closures & our campaign.

- To support all HM Coastguards.

- Promote sea safety & environment protection.

- To be proactive in our campaign & take our concerns to appropriate bodies & authorities.

- To work with all the major stakeholders in the future of HMCG.

Anyone in the UK can identify with the work of the RNLI & Other Volunteer Services do, risking their lives to save others, so it should only be a short step for all to realise that this is only made possible because of the work that HM Coastguard does. As an Island, we should always be mindful of the waters that surround us.

So my question is “Will you help by giving 5 minutes of your time?”

YES just 5 Minutes, that’s all it will take:

1 Minute to go online & sign the PETITION       http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/petitions/4403

4 Minutes to go to the webpage, download template letter & email to your MP            http://coastguardsos.com/how-do-i-help-save-the-coastguard

5 Minutes extremely valuable time for you, for us, for all.

5 Minutes in a Coastal Incident could mean the difference between life or death!

WHY BOTHER?

Well, if you look at the Blogs before this one, you will see that, by bothering we are making quite a difference: The supporters’ page demonstrates the wide variety of Public figures that agree with the campaign.

The campaign has exposed dangerous flaws in the way that Risk Assessments for the closures have been carried out. The lack of individual Risk Assessment of each station threatened, has highlighted a gross oversight by the Maritime Coastguard Agency responsible for the future of HM Coastguard. The dangers posed by insufficient Risk assessments, has prompted Devolved Governments to become directly involved with the whole question of Station closures.

The loss of Local Knowledge has always been central to the campaign, so it has become even more important now that evidence has emerged that the House of Commons & MPs were given misleading statements over station pairing & knowledge sharing (see news page & blog ‘Tangled Webs & White Elephants’). http://coastguardsos.com/

It would appear that many assurances given by the Shipping Minister (Mike Penning) in the House of Commons are being ignored or overturned without consultation, the latest is that MRCCs will be closed before the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) is up and running, in spite of the statement that this would not be the case until the MOC was proven to be capable of performing the role of stations to be closed.

In ‘Straight from the Horse’s Mouth’ Blog, a serving Coastguard Officer confirms many of the public’s fears over the closures, but also paints a very stark picture of the service and some disturbing insights in to the MCA / HMCG hierarchy ! As I write this blog, other information is coming to light which with all the News items and existing blogs on our website, should make compelling reasons to help the campaign. http://coastguardsos.com/

These efforts are beginning to pay off, as there is now an Early Day Motion requesting a House of Commons debate into the Coastguard Closures, supported at the time of writing by 32 MP’s. Please see link below

http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2010-12/2848

The campaign has drawn International recognition with the Canadian Mayday Alliance who fight similar cuts in their service, we continue to work together and share information & strategies’. We battle on, knowing that this is winnable; as proven by the Irish recently when closures were threatening Stations there. YES, it would be nice to have more help.  YES, together we can make a difference.

HAVE you got 5 Minutes?

The campaign is always happy to have help from anyone, any industry or sector. If you want to help in anyway, please contact info@coastguardsos.com outlining how you wish to get involved.

Other options:

If you don’t want to formally offer help but want to do more than the ‘5 Minutes’, here are some suggestions or visit http://coastguardsos.com/how-do-i-help-save-the-coastguard

Link our website & petition on any social media you can, email about us, tweet about us! Download the Flyer & put in prominent places (with permission) tell friends & groups about us. Look at the other links we have which include SAR Helicopter petition & Air Ambulance VAT petition. Read our blogs. Thank you.

Written by Coastal Joe

The Aquila – lessons not learnt and DfT & MCA not listening!

29. March 2012 · 4 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

On the 20th July 2009 the Fishing Vessel MV Aquila capsized with the loss of three crew.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry by the Sherriff concluded that although there was nothing that could have prevented the tragedy, there were lessons to be learnt by Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) & HM Coastguard (HMCG) in respect of delays and mistakes that were made.

The report is here:  http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2012FAI22.html

However, here are some extremely relevant points from the report that have a significant bearing on the current HM Coastguard ‘Modernisation Plan’, which intends to close up to 50% of the current 18 Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) & build a new National Maritime Operation Centre (MOC) to handle all 999 calls. Below is my assessment & summary of the report:

  1. There was initial doubt over the incident location due to duplicate place names even though the 999 caller gave precise location details.
  2. The original MRCC taking the 999 call & initiating the response assumed responsibility for the incident but then decided to pass to a nearer MRCC.
  3. The original MRCC failed to follow through with vital information when handing over to another MRCC.
  4. Mayday protocol was broken which failed to ensure all vessels in the area were properly advised & therefore respond immediately.
  5. The staffing levels at the nearest MRCC were inadequate.
  6. The experience & training of staff at the nearest MRCC were inadequate.
  7. MRCC staff were overstretched & unable to fulfil the requirement of a Search Plan.
  8. Senior HM Coastguard & MCA managers failed to support MRCC staff by allowing inadequacies and then further compounded this by showing little support to staff at the Inquest & subsequent revision of procedures/infrastructure.
  9. There are known areas of poor VHF Radio cover for Mayday communications.

Conclusions:

The MOC is destined to be a Call Centre of handlers with NO Coastguard experience due to insufficient staff (see Straight from the Horse’s Mouth blog), how any 999 operator can ensure proper incident location identification is impossible to comprehend, even when given accurate information as in (1).

The current modernisation plan requires frequent passing of incidents from MOC to MRCC with local knowledge or specialism in incident type, which according to the Inquiry recommendation should not happen, as mistakes are made as in (2 & 3).

The current modernisation plan requires remaining MRCC’s to double or quadruple the responsible areas that they have to deal with, which in turn will have a similar increase in workload. Given that some stations are already understaffed & poorly trained as in (5 & 6) poor decision making and mistakes are for more likely as in (3 & 4).

MCA & HMCG hierarchy /culture is failing to address the needs of staff with little evidence of embracing an improvement in relationships, staffing, training or procedures.(8)

The acceptance of poor radio coverage around the UK is intolerable with existing 18 MRCC’s but with half that number is downright dangerous, especially as the modernisation plan will be extremely reliant on remote monitoring. Eradication of Radio black spots needs to be a high priority.

There were some mistakes made by HM Coastguard in their handling of the MV Aquila tragedy, but the real problem here is that the Inquiry has made recommendation and points that are being ignored in the Modernisation  Plan.

How big a tragedy will it take before DfT & MCA listen to the Judicial System?

Currently DfT & MCA are failing to listen to Maritime Safety Experts, their own Coastguards, Industry, some rescue crews and the Public.

What will it take for this modernisation plan to be stopped?

Formal finding recommendations of the Sherriff:

In terms of Section 6(1)(e) of the Act there are other factors which are relevant to the circumstances of the death.

(i)                  The Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) should be responsible for the tasking of all Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters. This will avoid the confusion, and subsequent delay resultant from that, caused by tasking of SAR helicopters by individual Coastguard stations.

(ii)                The Co-ordination and control of live incidents should be retained by the Initial Action Station. If transfer is appropriate for whatever reason, that transfer should be conducted following upon a full assessment of the location of the incident, the VHF radio coverage in the area of the incident and the staffing levels and capability in the respective stations. The Initial Station should retain control until all such checks have been carried out and it is agreed fully with the transfer station that they are prepared to accept the transfer. Any verbal transfer of co-ordination must be followed up as soon as possible with written confirmation of the transfer including full details of the incident and full reasons why the transfer is appropriate.

(iii)               The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) should review their training procedures to ensure that sufficient training is provided to watch managers and those who might act up as watch managers in Staff Planning and Risk Evaluation.

(iv)              Training is required to be given by the MCA to coastguard watch managers and officers in regard to the timing of the broadcast of Mayday relay signals, the circumstances in which such signals should be repeated and the circumstances in which a Mayday Silence should be broadcast.

 

From the horse’s mouth

22. March 2012 · 12 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

The following blog has been submitted for inclusion by a serving Coastguard Officer despite Ministers issuing a gagging order last year. The Coastguard SOS campaign team is determined to report the truth and reality of the plans to close 50% of UK Coastguard rescue coordination centres and therefore feels that it is appropriate that the views of serving officers should be made public in order to counter the one sided argument put forward by Ministers. It is not pretty but the business of HM Coastguard very rarely is. These are personal words as they were received but the identity will remain anonymous in order to protect the Coastguard.

From the horse’s mouth

“The importance of our seas has not changed in two centuries. Shipping remains vital to our economy with 95% of our trade by weight carried by sea. But the way that we use our seas and shores has changed, presenting new problems and challenges.

Our seas are becoming more congested. The volume of shipping is increasing in many areas. Large numbers of Offshore Renewable Energy Installations are being developed around our coasts restricting the areas available to shipping.

Our coastline is getting busier. The UK has more than 20,000 miles of outstandingly beautiful coastline. Today millions of people use our seas, coasts and beaches for an increasingly wide variety of recreational purposes, often in areas that are also well used by commercial shipping”  UK Shipping Minister; Mike Penning MP. Nov 2011

When the Shipping Minister, Mike Penning MP, rose in Parliament on 22nd November 2011 to deliver his speech on “Coastguard Modernisation”, nobody was prepared for what was announced. Within two minutes of him starting to speak, or more accurately mumble and not even look up once from his notes, it was blatantly obvious to one and all that the decisions taken were Political and definitely not Operational. The fact that politicians had been meddling in things was plain for all to see and hear. Indeed, Sir Alan Massey when given a copy of the announcement, prior to it being delivered in the House, requested Mr Penning three times to clarify that he intended to close Liverpool MRCC and keep Holyhead MRCC open. It was not what the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) had been expecting and caused them to rapidly rethink their strategy for the future of the Coastguard Service.

When the first consultation closed, the Lib Dem Party Whip Mr Alistair Carmichael MP, marched into David Cameron’s office, banged the table and stated “I and the party will not support this plan unless you instruct the Shipping Minister to keep both Shetland and Stornoway stations open!” Guess what happened. The same thing happened when the Conservative Party Whip did the same and demanded that Milford Haven be kept open at the expense of Swansea. The complete and utter nonsense about DVLA in Swansea was just a smoke screen to hide the truth. Similarly, Albert Owen MP played the Welsh Language card and familiarity with Welsh place names with Mr Penning and lo Holyhead remained open at the expense of Liverpool. The whole Coastguard Service found the Welsh Language excuse to be laughable at best but also realised there was nothing they could do about it. The International language of the sea is English, however once you sail into waters around Wales it apparently changes to Welsh! After all, someone on holiday from the Midlands would not have a familiarity with Welsh place names and therefore totally negates that argument. With the stroke of a pen, the Minister without thinking operationally, had consigned the entire west coast of mainland England and Scotland to have no Coastguard station at all between Holyhead in North Wales and Aberdeen on the East coast of Scotland. A completely insane and reprehensible decision which he will regret making and which is still being fought to this day.

The Minister stated in his announcement that he was “Modernising” H.M. Coastguard, so let us look at what he means by that. “Modernisation is needed to address the limited resilience of current rescue co-ordination arrangements which have changed little since the removal of the visual watch in the 1970’s” The Minister was indeed badly briefed when he made this statement. H.M. Coastguard has undergone many reorganisations and equipment upgrades since 1970, indeed the latest upgrade occurred in 2011 under the RER Project. This enabled any MRCC in the country to connect to two stations to the North of it and two stations to the South of it and take over their functions totally. In effect, the one thing that the Minister was demanding “Resilience” was already in place and functioning. Why was he not informed of this or did he ignore it completely? There is no new updated equipment being fitted to the MOC or MRCC’s, it will be exactly the same equipment that they use now and which has served them so well for so many years. All that has changed is that the software has been upgraded but the functionality and limitations remain.

Despite submissions from serving Coastguard Officers, Merchant Shipping Companies, Offshore Oil, Gas and Renewable Energy companies and a host of leisure organisations, the Minister ignored the submissions made and forged ahead with his plan. Stating that this was a genuine consultation and that all submissions were considered from whatever source was rather disingenuous of the Minister and proved that he wasn’t listening. He and his political colleagues had already made their minds up and to hell with the consequences. The plan in its current form makes no sense operationally and is foolhardy, if not downright dangerous to say the least. It is widely felt, amongst the professional Coastguard Officers that should this plan remain in its current state then lives will be lost. Such is the strength of feeling regarding the “Future of the Coastguard Plan” that as of today’s date (08th March 2012), H.M. Coastguard is 110 qualified coastguard officers down on the National complement with more leaving on a daily basis. The backup Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) at Dover, which also controls the Channel Navigational Information System (CNIS) and the Harwich Sunk VTS is down 11 officers.

The reasons officers have given for leaving the MCA, when asked by their peers, are given below and in no particular order of priority :

1. Fearful of the way the service is heading and don’t wish to be associated with it in the future.

2. Unable to or have no wish to relocate to the MOC in Fareham as it would be too costly to do so. Even a 10% rise in salary would give the majority of officers an extra £1700 per annum before tax. This is hardly enough to cover the huge differential in the cost of living.

3. Believe that this is just the tip of the iceberg and that the Chief Coastguard intends to run the whole thing from Fareham and close every CG station in the country.

4. Believe that the MCA is becoming over reliant on technology and the system will fail catastrophically taking everything with it. Despite genuine concerns raised by officers, they are not being listened to and therefore feel undervalued, of no consequence and just a number.

5. Have absolutely no wish whatsoever to be associated with the Future Coastguard project as we do not consider it safe nor operationally viable.

6. Totally fed up with the “Jobs for the Boys” culture that is rife in MCA Headquarters. Posts are being created on a daily basis and filled by cronies of Senior Managers. They are not being advertised so that officers on the coast, who may have the skills being asked for and are under threat, do not have a chance under “Fair and Open competition to apply.”

7. We had an excellent relationship between the Ops Room and the Sector Managers/Teams on the coast. Now a huge wedge has been driven between the two disciplines and we are not even allowed to talk to them anymore. They feel isolated and so do we.

8. There has been little or no leadership nor direction shown by Senior Coastguard Officers for a long time now. They have seemed content to sit in the “Ivory Tower”, build their empires and issue edicts without fully understanding what they are demanding. It was extremely rare, maybe one a year, to receive a visit from a Senior Manager to their teams on the coast.

9. Sir Alan Massey is a breath of fresh air however he has come too late for me to stay. If he could change the plan then maybe I would consider it but I can’t take the chance.

These are genuine reasons given by officers with a genuine concern for the future. However, the MCA is rapidly losing staff, not only from the stations closing, but even more worryingly, increasingly from stations that have been informed that they are remaining open! Operational Managers in the MRCC’s can see the dangers but HQ Senior Managers don’t seem to care. It is unclear how much, if anything the Minister is being told regarding this or whether he is being kept in the dark. There appears to be an ostrich like mentality prevalent amongst the HQ Senior Managers that staff will move to the MOC regardless. The only person fearful of the “People Factor” is Sir Alan Massey himself, who has expressed that concern from the very beginning. It is now becoming apparent that the penny is beginning to drop regarding staff but it is too late. The floodgates are open and qualified staff is either being poached by the Private Sector or actively seeking out alternative employment. I have yet to hear of one officer who is willing to move to Fareham from any MRCC and that includes the south coast stations. To say that the morale in H.M. Coastguard is at an all time low would be an understatement, it is rock bottom and although MRCC managers are doing their best to maintain staff morale it is a losing battle. As stated above, experienced staff is being lost at an alarming rate and indeed some MRCC’s are running watches with unqualified staff and severely undermanned but that will never reach the ears of the Minister!

The Minister when answering questions from colleagues in the House on completion of his statement, set great store by the fact that “Pairing activities occur regularly between stations all the time”. This statement is in fact not true and pairing does not happen regularly. Again the minister has either been badly briefed, not told the truth or even worse misled the House on purpose. If it was the case and stations did pair regularly, then why has MCA Headquarters Operations Staff felt the need to produce an Operational Note to order, not request but order, stations to conduct pairing activities on a regular basis. Is this a rearguard action as so much of this plan appears to be?

The whole plan appears to be based on the wishes of a few politicians in power and not based on the Operational need of the United Kingdom and the general public. H.M. Coastguard is 190 years old and was formed to serve the needs of the International Mariner and the general public when they get into trouble and require assistance. It is not a political football that can be kicked whichever way suits at the time just to save a few coppers. Following through with the entire plan will save every taxpayer in the country £0.01 per annum. Do you think that they will miss that, I certainly don’t but I do think that they will play merry hell with the powers that be if there is nobody there to co-ordinate their rescue when they are in trouble and lives are lost.

The management and staff in MRCC Belfast and MRCC Stornoway are already ringing the alarm bells in respect of the way that the size of their areas of responsibility will increase with the closure of MRCC Clyde. Belfast, who incidentally has the smallest area of responsibility in the UK, are worried because Clyde normally cover for them and backs them up, contrary to what the Minister announced in the House, but now they are going to have to cope with at least a 250% increase in their incident level and they are openly stating that they will not cope and are fearful.

Similarly, Stornoway who will take on the other half of Clyde’s’ area are making noises too. This will be the acid test of the system as Clyde must close this year due to the lease expiring. After the Donaldson report stated that “no MRCC should be given an area bigger than they can handle”, why is the MCA and the Govt totally ignoring it and forging ahead with this insanity? The money saved will be minimal if anything at all. In fact the MCA are going to the Treasury to ask for upwards of £10M to commence the savings. How can borrowing money be a saving or am I missing something?

Some observations :

1. After submissions were made to the Transport Select Committee during the consultation period by serving Coastguard Officers, certain Senior Managers in MCA Headquarters have made it very clear that they did not approve of this and have made the lives and career progression of those officers, one Senior Operational Officer in the Northwest in particular, very difficult indeed. This was despite assurances being given to the Chair of the TSC by the Minister that this would not occur.

2. Posts within the MCA are not being advertised under fair and open competition but being given to cronies of Senior Officers as a reward for getting “onboard” during the consultation process. Indeed, it is common knowledge throughout the service that the recently appointed “Head of Counter Pollution” in the MCA was given the interview questions and expected answers prior to his interview. Even worse, the person who gave him the information was an old friend and on the interview board!

3. The MOC, which is a Fire Control Centre is currently a money pit and has recently had to be fireproofed after HSE declared it unsafe and a fire trap! Despite what the Minister said in his statement in November, the lease has still not been signed and is not expected to be signed until April 2012. In fact, all staff who has visited the MOC is all reporting that there is a huge amount of repair work going on which is being dressed up as “Snagging!” The main talking point however is the coffee machine which cost £20K.

4. The MCA Press Office have been instructed to play down any and all incidents reported to them for wider distribution. This particularly applies to those stations earmarked for closure as they should not be seen to be valuable.

5. Partners in the Civil Resilience Community, especially those with coastal boundaries, are becoming increasingly alarmed at the lack of engagement of H.M. Coastguard in Local Resilience Fora. This is on direct instructions from MCA HQ and stems from a total lack of knowledge regarding these matters by Senior Officers. Local MRCC managers recognise the importance of LRF’s and are continuing to engage with them when possible.

6. A statement was made by a very Senior Manager to the media on the south coast that the MCA would soon be recruiting 60 call handlers to work in the MOC. I could have sworn that the Minister stated that the MOC would not be a call centre!

7. The HS2 Project was costed, at today’s rates, at £62 Billion. Adding £2M to the annual MCA budget would fund a decent salary increase for the staff. Bring the current industrial action (ongoing for four years) to an end and still achieve station closures. Forth/Clyde and Yarmouth have to close due their leases expiring which would leave fifteen stations. It’s a win/win for the Government but apparently not an option they wish to consider.

Things in the country, indeed around the world are changing rapidly and the plan announced by the minister should be dynamic and able to move with and respond to those events. Although not local to the area but having read so much about it in the media lately, let me take Liverpool as an example. Peel Ports are building a new river berth to accommodate Post Panamax ships which will increase ship sizes and cargoes. Liverpool City Council has won the right for cruises to start and finish in the city which will drastically increase the liner and passenger traffic in the district. Offshore Renewable Energy is becoming big business and Liverpool, more specifically Cammel Lairds Shipyard, is earmarked to become the hub for this business. New Oil and Gas production wells are being drilled in Liverpool Bay and Morecambe Bay with a new static production platform to be constructed and located in Liverpool Bay. The floating Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal will be located off Fleetwood in Lancashire and will see one giant LNG Tanker per week visiting to discharge cargo. Blackpool receives upwards of 13M visitors a year with the English Lake District close behind with 8.5M visitors. These are all things that increase quite substantially the risk to life in the area that Liverpool MRCC covers, yet it has all been discarded on a whim. It may be worthy for the Shipping Minister to note that MRCC Liverpool has had a sizeable chunk of North Wales within its boundary for many years and has had no trouble in recognising, pronouncing or spelling Welsh Place Names! I am sure that the same could be said for other stations under threat around the country, but unless the Shipping Minister receives a good dose of common sense and changes his mind then H.M. Government may well find themselves in the dock charged with Corporate Manslaughter when people start to die as a result of this insane plan.

 

Tangled webs and white elephants

09. March 2012 · 7 comments · Categories: Coastguards, CoastguardSOS, Common Sense, Environment, Government, Local Knowledge, MCA Cuts, SafetyAtSea

We can exclusively reveal on Coastguard SOS that Parliament and the public are being misled. This campaign to save the Coastguard Stations has been driven by people with experience, who care deeply that flaws in the Government’s argument will cost lives.

Central to our campaign is the firmly held belief of current and former serving coastguard officers that local knowledge is critical to respond rapidly to cries for help. This is backed up by coastguard volunteers, serving RNLI crew and others, who live their lives by and on the sea around our coast.

The Transport Secretary has acknowledged the importance of local knowledge. Mike Penning has made the following statements in the House of Commons;

  • (Clyde) is already paired with Belfast. That happens today and has been the case for many years.
  • Belfast regularly covers the resilience for Clyde and has the local knowledge that is necessary.
  • (Walton-on-the-Naze) will close but the station that covers it on a regular basis will stay open (and) local knowledge will still be there …
  • The point of keeping one centre in a pair …. is to retain the local knowledge.

The problem is that most stations are not currently paired and so the Minister, Mike Penning, has misled Parliament when answering questions from Gemma Doyle (West Dumbartonshire), Louise Ellman (Liverpool Riverside), Paul Maynard (Blackpool North & Cleveleys), Bernard Jenkin (Harwich & North Essex), Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde), Katy Clark (North Ayrshire & Arran), Mark Durkan (Foyle) and Jim Shannon (Strangford). All these MPs would have thought, from Penning’s replies in the Commons (on 22nd November 2011), that pairing was routine, included all coastguard stations and had been in operation for years.  This is simply not true and the people at these stations would readily tell you so if they were not being ‘threatened’ to keep their mouths shut.

The question is, did the Minister deliberately lie to Parliament, or have the senior management of the Coastguard Service lied to the Minister?

If pairing had been a routine and regular occurrence for all stations, why do the notes of the CSM’s Maritime Meeting (on 25th January 2012) state;

 First step is to get all coastguard operators practised and confident with the current concept of operations for pairing at all locations. This should focus on …  specific activities such as routine monitoring of channel 16 or routine telephone calls to relieve load on paired MRCC.

It then goes on to say that once this is “achievable at all locations” work on the radio equipment replacement (RER) system can be considered.

At the meeting an official was given the task to “identify and develop standard formats for national procedures beginning with pairing operations”.

On the same day Parliament was misled, the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) blueprint, upon which Mike Penning based his answers, was published. On page seven it makes the remarkable statement “Currently we depend entirely on the local knowledge of our volunteers for detailed information concerning the coastline and coastal water activities where they live.”  Here perhaps lies the truth; that the Minister and the senior coastguard management simply don’t recognise the local knowledge held by personnel in the local stations that are to close and assume the volunteers will provide it. The volunteers may well have detailed knowledge of each cove and cliff, but they are not the ones who are answering calls on channel 16 or through 999. This is when local knowledge is critical to quickly identify where a distressed caller is, when they can’t give a street name or a city landmark.

Let us remember all these calls will in future be taken at a national command centre, even more remote and removed than one of the pairs of local centres that will remain open. This command centre is currently a white elephant.  It was originally commissioned and constructed as the national command centre for the fire service. Thankfully, before it could be put into operation, it was recognised that you cannot effectively co-ordinate an emergency service from a national location. Now, one could possibly think that fire service resources can be directed from anywhere, so long as you have an infrastructure of roads, buildings with numbers and even post codes. If it wasn’t found to be possible for the fire service, imagine how someone receiving the call at the national command centre in Fareham, Hampshire, would deal with a caller caught in a storm, saying “Help please, I’m off the Norfolk coast and we hired a boat from a little place called Ren…”  The radio goes dead at this point.

The national command centre will co-ordinate the UK Search and Rescue region, covering some 1.25 million square nautical miles of sea and over 10.5 thousand nautical miles of coastline.

For more information, please contact:  Dennis O’Connor - 07818 038200 - pdmvc@hotmail.com

LATEST UPDATE

As of 09.30 hours this morning, we’ve had three responses.  Just three!  So who cares?

Iain McKenzie MP, Inverclyde

I should also point out for inclusion that I have written to the Prime Minister following my question to him last month at PMQ asking for his thoughts on reversing this decision, I await a response.

Mike McKenzie MSP

I fully support this campaign and have spoken twice in the Scottish Parliament on this issue.

Maria Eagle MP, Labour’s shadow Transport Secretary

The  decision to close nearly half of the UK‘s coastguard stations has nothing to do with improving safety along Britain’s coastline but is a direct consequence of the government cutting the transport budget too far and too fast. The proposals risk leaving our coastal communities without vital local knowledge that can make all the difference in an emergency as stations are forced to cover areas over which they have no previous experience, contrary to the claims of Ministers.

Thank you for caring, and being honest & transparent ~ there are good people out there.

 

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